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INTRODUCTION

The decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Legislative
Research Commission v. Brown (hereinafter L.R.C. v. Brown)
has been called Kentucky's Marbury v. Madison because of the
number of fundamental constitutional issues which were resolved
by the Court in that case. The antecedents of the litigation are
at least as old as the Constitutional Convention of 1890-91
(Constitutional Convention), and are at least as current as the
nationwide era of legislative independence which has marked the
the 1980's. Accordingly, the following analysis of the Court's
decision attempts not only to review the legal issues involved in
the case and the Court's disposition of them, but also to analyze
both the historical backdrop and the historical impact of the
case.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP

A. The Constitutional Convention of 1890-91: A Reaction to
Legislative Ascendancy
A desire to control legislative excesses constituted the principal reason for the convocation of the Constitutional Convention. John D. Carroll, a delegate from Henry County, observed:
"[E]xcept for the ... abuses practiced by the Legislative Department of this State ... no proposition to call a Constitutional
Convention could ever have received a majority of the votes of
the people of Kentucky." 1 Former Speaker of the Kentucky
House of Representatives, William C. Owens of Scott County,
told his delegate: "[E]very reform you attempt will turn to ashes
.. unless you do something to reform the Legislative Depart2
ment."
1I OFFCIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, To ADOPT, AMEND
OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY

as DEBATES].
2 II DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3821.

1482 (1890) [hereinafter cited
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Reflecting a national problem, by 1880 the Kentucky legislature had become bogged down in local and private legislation
to the neglect of the problems that affected the state as a whole.
This preoccupation with local and private matters in part reflected traditional legislative concerns and in part represented
newly institutionalized greed and corruption. American legislatures of the colonial and antebellum periods customarily dealt
more with the petitions of individual citizens and their localities
than with general concerns. 3 What differed about the post-Civil
War period in Kentucky and elsewhere was that the quantity of
local and private matters had grown unmanageable. 4 Further, a
relatively new type of "private" petitioner, the business corporation, had begun to extract profitable immunities and other
benefits from the legislature through the use of paid lobbyists,
5
intense political pressure and, in all probability, legislative bribes.
The General Assembly of 1883-1884 generated a typical legislative work product. Of the 1,640 statutes enacted, 1,471 were
officially described as private or local laws and another sixtynine in reality fit that description. 6 Thus, 1,540 statutes, or nearly
ninety-four percent, concerned local or private matters. Sample
statutes included: "An act for the benefit of W.M. Davis, late
sheriff of Clinton County" ;7 "An act to legalize the acts of the
levy court of Webster County made for certain years"; 8 "An
act to incorporate the Kentucky Paving and Contract Company"; 9 and "An act to prohibit the chasing of deer with dogs
in Jackson County." 0
All of this resulted not only in legislative inattention to the
newly emerging problems of the Industrial Revolution, which
demanded laws applicable to the entire state, but also in legislative inefficiency and incompetence. Confronted with several
3

R.

LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS: DEVELOPMENT, STATUS,

AND TREND OF THE

TREATMENT AND EXERCISE OF LAWMAKING POWERS 538-49 (reprint 1971).
4 Id. at 532-92.

1 II DEBATES, supra note 1,'at 2527-28 (statement of H.R. Bourland).
6 See 1883-1884 Ky. Acts.
Act of Apr. 30, 1884, ch. 1131, 1883 Ky. Acts 598.
Act of Apr. 30, 1884, ch. 1132, 1883 Ky. Acts 599.
Act of Apr. 30, 1884, ch. 1150, 1883 Ky. Acts 642-44.
,o Act of Apr. 30, 1884, ch. 1138, 1883 Ky. Acts 602.
" See III DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3868.

1984-85]

SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS

thousand bills each session and only a few months to consider
them, legislators enacted many bills into law without even reading them." This system produced statutes that conferred special
privileges on a few, and legislation that was so sloppily drafted
2
that it became the object of public ridicule.
Not surprisingly, these deficiencies translated into political
unrest that produced the Constitutional Convention of 18901891,13 and led to the election of delegates who were determined
to eliminate as many of the legislative abuses as possible.14 To
this end the Constitution of 1891 (Constitution) more resembles
a code of laws than a constitution. Although constitutions typically consist of general declarations of powers, rights and limitations, the Constitution of 1891 contains very specific and
detailed powers, rights and, especially, limitations. The document prohibits most types of local and private legislation by
specifically proscribing twenty-eight types of such legislation and
by generally making most other types of local and private laws
difficult to enact.' The Constitution also prohibits the legislature
from granting tax immunities except to a few specified activities.' 6 In an effort to control the tendency of the legislature to

12 A Garrard County lawyer, Robert M. Bradley, published a pamphlet in 1879
satirizing the entire Kentucky legislative process as being replete with semiliterate legislators and illogical, self-contradictory legislation. R. BRADLEY, A SKETCH OF GRANNY
SHORT'S BARBECUE AND T=E GENERAL STATUTES OF KENTUCKY (1879). At the Constitutional Convention of 1890-91 Governor Simon B. Buckner told his fellow delegates that
he had received from the most recent legislature "a bill involving large interests ... of
the people of two large and populous counties, passed through both bodies of the
Legislature in thirty-five minutes, . . . [t]he tenor [of which] was unknown entirely to
almost every person in those two counties, although it involved their interests very
materially." See III DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3868. Alleging that probably "not ten
men in the Legislature knew what they were voting on," Buckner declared that he
vetoed the bill, a practice too seldom relied on by chief executives to restrain such illconsidered legislation. See id.
13 H. TAPP & J. KLoTTER, KENTUCKY: DECADES OF DiscoRD 1865-1900, at 258-68
(1977).
4 Id. at 258-60.
" See Ky. CONST. §§ 59-60.
16 See KY. CONST. § 170. This was a direct response to previously successful
efforts
of such powerful lobbies as the Louisville & Nashville Railroad which had secured
legislative exemptions from taxation, as an incentive for new railroad construction. See
H. TAP & J. KLorER, supra note 13, at 300.
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create too many counties, 17 specific limitations were placed on
8
the future establishment of counties.1
The delegates intended to make the legislature more efficient
and less costly. For example, they required each bill to be printed
and to be read at least once (and as often as three times), thereby
reducing opportunities for clumsy draftsmanship. 19 Believing that
the elimination of most private and local law-making would
reduce the time needed for legislative sessions,20 the delegates
specified that each legislative session could last for only sixty
legislative days. 21 They continued the 1850 Constitution's requirement that regular sessions be held biannually, z2 and placed
restraints on special sessions by giving the Governor exclusive
power to convoke them and to determine their agenda.? To
24
control and eliminate the problem of coping with job-seekers,
the drafters also limited to twenty-two the number of employees
the legislature could hire.25
Cynicism about the legislature's ability to control two perceived malefactors of the Industrial Revolution, corporations in
general and railroads in particular, prompted the delegates to
impose very specific limitations and obligations upon these two
institutions and upon the legislature. 26 Corporations were prohibited from issuing watered stock, 27 required to have resident
agents,2 8 and restricted in their ability to own and hold real
estate. 29 The legislature was required to enact an antitrust stat-

17 By 1890, Kentucky had more counties per acre than any state except the more
densely populated Rhode Island. The legislature created only one additional county after
1891.

, See Ky. CONST.

§ 63.

,9 See Ky. CONsT. § 46. See also Ky. CONST. §§ 51, 55 (additional mechanical
limitations upon the General Assembly's power).
20 III DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3790 (statement of I.A. Spalding).
21

23

See Ky. CoNsT. § 42.
See Ky. CONST. § 36.
See Ky. CoNsT. § 80.

2 See III DEBATEs, supra note 1, at 4360-61, 4921-22 (statements of Charles Durbin
and H.G. Petrie).

See Ky. CoNsT. § 249.
26

See III DEBATEs, supra note 1, at 3637 (statement of J.D. Clady).

See Ky. CONST. § 193.
See Ky. Co NsT. § 194.
See Ky. CONST. §§ 192, 210.
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ute.30 By general law, the legislature was required to provide for
the revocation of the charters of domestic corporations which
abused their powers, 3 for the regulation of telephone and telegraph companies, 32 and for the inspection of grain, tobacco and
other produce. 33 The Constitution imposed on railroads the duty
to maintain equal and uniform rates and services 34 and forbade
them from operating nonrailroad businesses. 35 Fearful that the
powerful railroad lobby would secure the abolition of the recently established Railroad Commission,3 6 the delegates made

that agency a constitutional body. 37 Afraid that future legislators
would continue to avoid needed reform, 38 the delegates also

required the General Assembly to enact a child labor law4 39 and

to establish a state reformatory for adolescent criminals. 0
Without discussion, the delegates incorporated into the Constitution essentially the same provisions about the separation of

powers which had been in the original Constitution of 1792 and
in its two successors, thereby preserving language that originally

was probably intended to limit the legislature. 41 Although the
30See KY. CoNsT. § 198.
SI See KY. CONST. § 205.
'2 See Ky. CONST. § 199.
, See KY. CoNsr. § 206.
See KY. CoNrsT. §§ 197, 213.
" See KY. CONST. § 210.
36 See IV DEBATES, supra note 1, at 4984 (statement of Emery Whitaker).
17 See KY. CONST. § 209. To curtail the legislative influence of the lobby, the
delegates prohibited one of the lobby's favorite practices, the granting of free railroad
passes to public officials. See KY. CONST. § 197; III DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3638-39
(statement of J.D. Clady).
1 " 'Delegates to the convention attempted to anticipate future needs of the
government and provide for them in specific sections of the constitution.' " H. TAPP &
J. KLOTTER, supra note 13, at 266 (quoting T. CLARK, A HisToRY OF KENTUCKY 425
(rev. ed. 1960)).
3, See KY. CoNsT. § 243.
,0 See KY. CONST. § 252.
4' The relevant sections provide:
Section 27. The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of
them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which
are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those
which are judicial, to another.
Section 28. No person or collection of persons, being of one of those
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the
others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
KY. CoNsT. §§ 27, 28.
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debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1792 were not recorded, it is clear that they took place at a time in which the
separation of powers doctrine had taken on new and important
meaning for American constitutional theorists and practitioners.
By 1776 Americans had invented and developed the doctrine in
order to resist encroachments by the executive branch. 42 During
the next sixteen years the legislative branch assumed so much
power that theorists redefined the separation of powers doctrine
to protect the executive and judicial branches from legislative
encroachment. 43 Thus, when the Constitution of 1792 was
adopted, the separation of powers doctrine had evolved into a
limitation of the powers of the legislature. 4
While the framers of the Kentucky Constitution of 1891 did
not dwell on the separation of powers provisions (sections 27
and 28), in debates on other issues they did make clear their
devotion to the principles contained in those sections. 45 In their
effort to curtail the practice of enacting private and local legislation, the delegates incorporated into the new Constitution a
general provision specifying that "in all other cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted.' '46 Some delegates further suggested that a special committee of legislators "learned in law" be empowered at each
legislative session to decide whether "a general law [could] be
made applicable ' 47 to a problem proposed to be solved by special
legislation. Believing that this committee would represent an
invasion by the legislature on the powers of the judiciary, the
delegates rejected this proposal to avoid violating the separation
of powers doctrine. 48 Despite great dissatisfaction with the Gov42

G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 157-58

(1969). See also text accompanying notes 209-12 infra.
41 G. WOOD,supra note 42, at 446-54, 547-53.
4 See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF PowERS 152 (1967).
41 See, e.g., I DEBATES, supra note 1, at 1050 (statement of W. Hendrick).

41

See Ky. CONST. § 59(29).

47

III DEBATES, supra note 1, at 4006 (statement of McDermott).

41

In the words of Thomas S.Pettit, a prominent member of the convention, the

proposed legislative committee "mingle[d] the judicial system with the legislative system
.. the theory of this government has always been for the purpose of keeping the
several departments entirely independent one of the other.... ." Id. Delegates also
resisted the proposal because they believed it would involve an undue concentration of
legislative power in the hands of a few select legislators. See id. at 4007-09, 4014-15
(statements of T. Pettit and C.F. Burnham).
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ernor's pardoning power, 49 the delegates likewise rejected, as
violative of the separation of powers doctrine, a proposal requiring the Governor to make an annual report on pardons to
the legislature: 0
The Governor, whose office was not a strong one during the
latter half of the nineteenth century, emerged from the Conven-

tion with greater power. Although the Governor lost the authority to appoint the Secretary of State"' and the Railroad
Commissioners 5 2 he acquired the power to make line item ve54
toes5 3 to determine the agenda for special legislative sessions
and to commute sentences of convicts.5 5 Despite vigorous opposition, 56 the Governor retained the unconditional power to
5
pardon 5 7 one of the most complete in the nation. 1
In 1892, after Kentucky's highest court sidestepped a challenge to the final document,5 9 the Constitution of 1891 was
implemented. This document specifically limited the power of
• See I DEBATES, supra note 1, at 1088-90 (statement of C. Bronston).
o See id. at 1119 (statement of James Blackburn opposing the measure because it
violated "[o]ne of the foremost ideas in our form of Government ... that these three
co-ordinate branches of Government are independent, the one of the other, and that
neither [sic] shall be tributary to the other").
1' See KY. CoNsT. § 91.
52 See KY. CONST. § 209.
11See Ky. CONST. § 88.
See KY. CONST. § 80.
1 See Ky. CONST. § 77.
36 See I DEBATES, supra note 1, at 240-48, 1087-1123, 1245-1301, 1318-50.
"See Ky. Co NsT. § 77.
C. JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN Tm UNITED STATES 15-16 (1922).
" After the voters had overwhelmingly ratified the new constitution in a referendum mandated by the legislature, the delegates reconvened in order to "correct grammatical mistakes, ambiguities and contradictions." IV DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5636,
5682-83. However, in the process they also made several substantive changes including
making the office of Railroad Commissioner elective rather than appointive, see KY.
CoNsT. § 209; IV DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5819-56, and deleting § 76 which had
empowered the Governor to "appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all
State officers who are not required by this Constitution or the laws made thereunder,
to be elected by the people," see IV DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5728. As explained by
Charles J. Bronston, delegate from Fayette County and principal proponent of the § 76
revision, the deletion was necessary to avoid a conflict with what would be § 93 which
specified: "Inferior State officers, not specifically provided for in this Constitution, may
be appointed or elected, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, for a term not
exceeding four years, and until their successors are appointed or elected and qualified."
See id. at 5728-29 (quoting Ky. CONST. § 93). Bronston stated that the Constitution of
1850 had not contained a provision similar to § 76 and that the provision had been
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the legislature and, on balance, enlarged the power of the Gov-

ernor.6° More importantly, the Constitution gave future Governors, faced with much greater and unforeseen demands on state
government, the opportunity to expand significantly the powers
of their office. Because of the constitutional limitations, the

legislature could not meet these demands, and it was thus left
to the Governor to fill the void.
B.
1.

The Struggle For Legislative Parity
The Legislative Research Commission - From Research
Assistance to Shadow Government

The Constitution of 1891 resulted in an imbalance of political
power between the Governor and the legislature. 6' Handicapped
by its brief session 62 and its lack of legal existence after its
biennial adjournment, 63 the legislature was unable to gather sufficient information to evaluate legislative proposals submitted by
the Governor. This lack of information gave the Governor a
special advantage in affecting the biennial budget, and thereby

all of state government.
A consensus arose that an entity should be created to provide
the legislature with the requisite research during the interims
between its sessions to enable its members to better discharge
their legislative function. Consequently, the Legislative Research
included in the Constitution of 1891 only to permit the Governor to appoint the State
Librarian. Id.
Because of these and other post-referendum revisions, a group of "voters and taxpayers" brought an action in the Franklin County Circuit Court to enjoin both the
Public Printer from printing the new Constitution at public expense and the Secretary
of State from preserving the document in the State Archives as the official Constitution
of Kentucky on the grounds that it had been unconstitutionally revised after the voters
had ratified it. The Franklin Circuit Court's refusal to issue an injunction was affirmed
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals on the ground that the question was political and
not judicial. See Miller v. Johnson, 18 S.W. 522, 524 (Ky. 1892).
60 See notes 51-58 supra and accompanying text.
61 One might mark this era's beginning as the passage of the executive reorganization act in 1936, an act which Governor Chandler utilized extensively. Government
Reorganization Act of 1936, CARRoLL's KY. STAT. ANN. §§ 4618-68 to -148 (Baldwin
1936).
See Ky. CONST. § 42.
63 See fiote 66 infra and accompanying text.
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Commission (L.R.C.) was born in 1936 as the Legislative Council. 64 However, the very existence of the L.R.C. in 1936 was
questionable under the Adjournment Clause 65 because "[a] leg-66
islative body ceases to exist at the moment of its adjournment.
In addition to the question raised by the Adjournment Clause,
there was a question under section 249 of the Kentucky Constitution concerning employment of the L.R.C.'s staff members.
Section 249 expressly limits the number of employees who may
be hired by the legislative department, and the L.R.C.'s staff
vastly exceeds that number.6 7 In the leading case construing
section 249, Shanks v. Julian,68 the Court extensively reviewed
the portion of the Constitutional Convention Debates which led
to the adoption of section 249, and noted that the Constitutional

Convention voted down a provision which would have permitted
the General Assembly to choose "such officers as were necessary
'69
for the organization and work of the General Assembly.
Although recognizing the legislature's need for additional help
and the present day inadequacy of section 249, the Court held
that the section prohibited the employment of staff members for
the L.R.C.

70

Act of Mar. 7, 1936, ch. 1, art. XXI, § 1, 1936 Ky. Acts 44-48 (Extra Session
- Reorganization) (codified at CARROLL'S KY. STAT. ANN. §§ 4618-138 to -142 (Baldwin
1936)). See also Lloyd and Singleton, Kentucky Government, L.R.C. INrORMaMxoNAL
BurLLETm No. 137 (1980).

0 See Ky. CONST. § 42.

Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984) (citing
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)) [hereinafter cited as L.R.C. v.
Brown]. Arguably this constitutional concern was mooted by the adoption of the Kenton
Amendment, ch. 440, 1978 Ky. Acts 1400-01 (codified at KY. CONST. §§ 30a, 31a, 36a,
42a, 256). See also notes 113-17 infra and accompanying text.
67 Section 249 provides:
The house of representatives of the general assembly shall not elect, appoint, employ or pay for, exceeding one chief clerk, one assistant clerk,
one enrolling clerk, one sergeant at arms, one doorkeeper, one janitor,
two cloakroom keepers and four pages; and the senate shall not elect,
appoint, employ or pay for, exceeding one chief clerk, one assistant clerk,
one enrolling clerk, one sergeant at arms, one doorkeeper, one janitor, one
cloakroom keeper and three pages; and the general assembly shall provide,
by general law, for fixing the per diem or salary of all of said employees.
"

KY. CONST.

§

249.

280 S.W. 1081 (Ky. 1926).
See id. at 1082 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 1084, 1086. The Court considered the purposes of § 249 and the
legislature's need for help and stated:
69

70
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In addition to the questions posed by section 249 and the
Adjournment Clause, section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution
prohibits a member of one department of government from
serving in another department. 71 Accordingly, had the L.R.C.
been composed only of members of the legislature, and not been
chaired by either the Governor or the Lieutenant Governor, its
constitutionality would have been doubtful under section 28.
To circumvent these problems, the Legislative Council was
created in 1936-with the Governor as its Chair-ostensibly as
an agency within the executive department.7 2 The original Legislative Council was composed of fifteen members-five senators
appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, five representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and five
state officials appointed by the Governor.7 3 The Legislative
In the light of ... the debate in the convention on the adoption of
this section as a part of our fundamental law, it is very clear that the
purpose of section 249 was to forbid the employment of any help by the
General Assembly other than that designated in that section ....
It was
thought by the convention that the help authorized by section 249 would
be ample for any possible need thereafter of either house of the General
Assembly, and, although the lapse of time and march of progress have
demonstrated that the convention was mistaken in this, yet this argument
.. goes to the amending of section 249 rather than the ignoring of it.
... The main purpose of the section was economy. It may have turned
out to be false economy, but, false or true, economy was its main purpose.

Id.

.. We have arrived at this conclusion with regret. We fully realize
that the growth of this commonwealth since the adoption of the present
Constitution, the development of its natural resources, the expansion of
its mineral production; the increasing importance of its manufactories have
all brought in their train numerous and perplexing problems, most of
which call for the serious attention of and solution by the legislative body.
With the growth of business, the need of help to dispatch it necessarily
increases. No one who is acquainted with the immense amount of detail
work which now confronts our legislative bodies can help but admit the
need, at least in part, if not in its entirety, of the extra help provided for
in these resolutions. It is to be regretted that the constitutional convention
in its wisdom did not foresee our material growth and expansion and did
not, at least in this particular, leave a freer rein to the General Assembly.
But regrets or no, it did not and there is naught else for us to do until the
people by their sovereign will change that instrument, but to abide in letter
and in spirit by the mandates of the Constitution.

Id 664 S.W.2d at 924 (interpreting KY.
72Id. at 910.
7 Id.

CoNsT.

§ 28).
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Council was empowered solely to engage in fact-finding and to
employ a director and research assistants for that purpose3 4
In 1948, the Legislative Council was renamed the Legislative
Research Commission, and its membership reduced to seventhe Governor as Chair, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority75
and minority floor leaders of both the Senate and the House.
The powers of the L.R.C. remained substantially the same as
those of the Legislative Council, namely, fact-finding and research, and its new name well-described its role. In 1956, the
Governor replaced the Governor as Chair of the
Lieutenant
76
L.R.C.
The very existence of the L.R.C. is an example of the "play
in the joints" that is often essential for the operation of our
system of government. The willingness of the legislative and
executive branches to engage in the fiction that the L.R.C. was
an agency of the executive department enabled the L.R.C. to
function in the interim between sessions and to hire necessary
employees to discharge its support functions without violating
the Constitution. 77 However, with the gradual transformation of
the L.R.C. from a titular executive agency conducting research
into an administrative arm of the General Assembly, the forces
that created L.R.C. v. Brown were set in motion.
Historians might trace this transformation to the 1963-67
gubernatorial administration of Louie B. Nunn, a Republican
Governor in a predominantly Democratic state. There was an
obvious incentive for Democratic legislative leaders to demand
that a minority party Governor share power with them. In
addition, during Nunn's administration, two dominant Democratic political figures presided over the legislature: Lt. Gov.
74 Id. In 1944, the membership of the Legislative Council was increased to sixteen
persons-eight senators appointed by the Lieutenant Governor and eight representatives

appointed by the Speaker of the House. The powers of the Legislative Council were
expanded to include organizational functons prior to each regular session of the General

Assembly, but the Council was limited to a total of sixty meeting days each biennium.
Act of Mar. 18, 1944, ch. 149, 1944 Ky. Acts 317-20.
11See Act of Feb. 27, 1948, ch. 15, 1948 Ky. Acts 59-62.
16 See Act of Mar. 12, 1956, ch. 7, art. XII, § 1, 1956 Ky. Acts (Special Sessions)
54-56.
" 75 Ky. Op. Att'y. Gen. 142 (Feb. 18, 1975); 74 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 842 (Dec.
1, 1974); 73 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 817 (Dec. 11, 1973).
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Wendell H. Ford and Speaker of the House of Representatives
Julian M. Carroll. With these forces at work, it was inevitable
that the role of interim committees of the L.R.C. began to
expand during this era.
The next change occurred in 1974, after Ford had become
Governor and Carroll had become Lieutenant Governor. The
Lieutenant Governor was replaced as Chair of the L.R.C. by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, as co-Chairs. 78 Consequently, with
79
all members of the L.R.C. being members of the legislature,
the L.R.C. became a legislative agency. Despite the obvious
constitutional problems created by this legislative action, Governor Carroll chose not to challenge the action. Some would
attribute Governor Carroll's decision not to challenge the L.R.C.'s
new role to his being a product of the legislature and a champion
of legislative independence. For example, he supported the Kenton Amendment which subsequently legitimized the interim committee structure of the L.R.C. s0 Other pundits would say that
Carroll so dominated the legislature that the L.R.C.'s independence existed only in the statute books and legal challenges were
unnecessary. In either event, the constitutional issues lurked
undecided for a decade.
The ascendancy of John Y. Brown, Jr. to the governorship
in December, 1979, signaled a legislative renaissance in Kentucky
that strove to redress the nearly fifty-year old constitutional
imbalance. As Governor, Brown quickly became a disciple of
his father's long-time advocacy of legislative independence, a
stance that suited his image as a non-traditional Governor who
critics asserted was disinterested in the details of governance and
especially in the legislative process. 81 The legislative renaissance
71 See

Act of Apr. 1, 1974, ch. 353, 1974 Ky. Acts 675-76.

The ex officio members of the L.R.C. are the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, the Assistant President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives, the
majority and minority floor leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the
majority and minority party whips of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
the majority and minority caucus chairs of the Senate and House of Representatives.
71

Ky. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 7.090(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS].

10 See text accompanying notes 113-17 infra for a discussion of the Kenton Amendment.

., See Brown to Battle Huddleston in Senate Race, The Courier-Journal (Louisville), Mar. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 3 (Metro ed.).
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was continued when the 1980 General Assembly made extensive
use of the interim committee system to keep a careful watch on
the executive branch. These efforts coincided with a national
trend of state legislative revitalization characterized by such actions as legislative vetoes of administrative regulations and the
formation of interim legislative committees on capital construc2
tion projects.1
The 1982 General Assembly moyed more boldly into the
national movement of legislative independence by enacting a
group of laws, many patterned after laws recently enacted in
other states. It amended Kentucky Revised Statutes section 7.090
[hereinafter referred to as KRS] to declare that the L.R.C. was
"an independent agency of state government ... which is exempt from control by the executive branch and from reorganization by the Governor.' '83 It enacted a series of statutes that,
inter alia, empowered the L.R.C. to veto administrative regulations issued by the Governor,8 4 to nominate persons to the
Governor for appointment to certain executive agencies, 85 to
approve gubernatorial application for federal block grants,8 6 to
determine and/or review certain reductions in the state budget, 87
and to approve or disallow gubernatorial orders reorganizing the
executive branch. 88 Further, the General Assembly empowered
the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate to make appointments to certain boards and agencies of
the executive department89 and seemed to empower itself to enact
laws during organizational sessions. 9°
Perhaps chastened by the results of his abdication of power
in the name of legislative independence, Governor Brown vetoed
several of these statutes, 91 only to have each of his vetoes over81See Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983); Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth.,
448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982); General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982).
83 See KRS § 7.090(1) (1982); notes 99-123 infra and accompanying text.
' See notes 278-80 infra and accompanying text.
s'See notes 223-26 infra and accompanying text.
See note 339 infra and accompanying text.
8,See notes 324-34 infra and accompanying text.
' See note 352 infra and accompanying text.
See note 224 infra.
9oSee notes 110, 117 infra.

91See Leaders want changes in 2 bills to avoid veto, make peace with Brown, The
Courier-Journal (Louisville), Apr. 13, 1982, at Al, col. 1 (Metro ed.).
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ridden by the General Assembly. 92 Shortly thereafter, the L.R.C.
filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
each of these statutes. 93 Governor Brown and Attorney General
to insure that every questionSteven L. Beshear counterclaimed
94
impleaded.
was
statute
able
In their counterclaim, Governor Brown and Attorney General Beshear did not invoke the Adjournment Clause or sections
249 or 28 of the Kentucky Constitution to seek a decree abolishing the L.R.C. or its staff. 95 The Court therefore did not
reach the issue of whether the L.R.C. could constitutionally
exist. However, Brown and Beshear did contest the constitutionality of KRS section 7.090(1), which declared that the L.R.C.
was "an independent agency of state government," asserting
that this statute was tantamount to declaring either that the
General Assembly could sit in continuous session via the L.R.C.,
or that L.R.C. was an unauthorized fourth branch of government. 96 Brown and Beshear conceded arguendo that the L.R.C.
is a legislative agency and argued only that it must be limited to
its historic fact-finding functions. 97 The Court agreed with Brown
"There is, simply put, no fourth
and Beshear, stating forcefully:
98
branch of government."
2.

There is No Fourth Branch of Government

The effort of Brown and Beshear to circumscribe the role of
the L.R.C. rested primarily on the sixty-day limit on legislative
sessions. 99 Their argument pointed to the dominant purpose of
92 See A contentiogs House overrides seven vetoes and ignores another, The
Courier-Journal (Louisville), Apr. 14, 1982, at Al, col, 5 (Metro ed.).
91 See 664 S.W.2d at 909; Brief for Appellees at 13, L.R.C. v, Brown, 664 S.W.2d
907 (Ky. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 13,
"

See Reply Brief for Appellants at 7, L,R,C. v, Brown, 664 SW.2d 907 (Ky,

1984) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Appellants],
See 664 S.W.2d at 910.

9 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 26-36, Ironically, the LR.C.'s Petition
for Rehearing asked the Court to address the § 249 issue and overrule Shanks v. Julian.

Id. at 35. The Court ignored this entreaty.
664 S.W.2d at 917.

9 See Ky. CONST. § 42. Their tacit concessions to the existence of the L,R.C. and
the role of the interim committees implicitly recognized the impact of the Kenton
Amendment, although for strategic reasons this was never expressly admitted.
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the framers of the present Kentucky Constitution-to limit the
power of the General Assembly. °°
The sixty-day limit on biennial sessions was the most significant restriction placed on the General Assembly by the Constitutional Convention. Under Kentucky's first two constitutions,
the General Assembly met in annual sessions without restrictions
as to length.' 0 ' Under the Constitution of 1850 the legislature
met biannually for sixty-day sessions, but was empowered to
extend the length of its session by "a vote of two-thirds of all
the members elected to each house,"' 02 an action often taken by
the legislature.' 0 3 Thus, under prior constitutions, the legislature
had the power to hold continuous sessions.
However, the framers of the present Constitution took that
power away from the General Assembly and, for the first time
in the history of Kentucky, put an absolute limit on the number
of days that the legislature could sit.' ° They also eliminated the
General Assembly's implicit right to determine the agenda for
special sessions by expressly giving that right to the Governor,
whose power to convene such sessions was renewed. 0° Thus, the
,10
See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 26-36. See also text accompanying
notes 1-60 supra for a discussion of the Constitutional Convention of 1890-1891. A
contemporaneous decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals said:
It is a matter of history that the object which, above all others, was sought
to be attained by the adoption of the new constitution, was the placing of
a check upon the power of the legislative branch. No one can compare
that instrument with its predecessors without being struck by the almost
countless restraints which are placed upon that power, and the safeguards
provided against legislative usurpation. This central idea gives color and
tone to the entire organic law .... When that instrument was before the
people for adoption, there was debate and discussion over its provisions
in the press and on the stump.... Practically the whole membership of
the convention went upon the platform in its defense, and, while they
differed in their estimates of its advantages, the burden of each argument
was still that it was a shield to the citizen against legislative usurpation,
encroachment, and abuse.
Pratt v. Breckinridge, 65 S.W. 136, 142 (Ky. 1901).
"I See KY. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 17; Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 24.
10 See KY. CoNsT. of 1850, art. II, § 24.
101See Defendant's Exhibit No. 4, Legislative Research Comm'n, Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky Bicentennial Edition, Information Bulletin No. 112, p.
ix, L.R.C v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
101See Ky. CONST. § 42.
"I See Ky. CONST. § 80.
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concept of the General Assembly as a body sitting in continuous
session was abolished by the framers of the Consititution in
1891.
This restriction has survived numerous attempts to delete or
modify it. In modern times the General Assembly has thrice
attempted to amend the Constitution to enable it once again to
become "a continuous body," but each proposed amendment
was defeated by the people. The Constitution proposed by the
Constitution Revision Assembly in 1966 (and likewise rejected
by the people) would have made the General Assembly "a continuous body." 1 6 In 1969, the legislative article of the Constitution Revision Assembly's draft, which also would have made
the General Assembly "a continuing body," was submitted to
the people as a separate amendment and was defeated. '1 7 In 1972,
the General Assembly proposed the so-called annual sessions
amendment which omitted any reference to the General Assembly as being a continuous body, but in 1973 it too was defeated. 10
When the Kenton Amendment passed, it had omitted the
phrase making the General Assembly "a continuing body," as
well as the provision for annual sessions. The Kenton Amendment provided only for the limited organizational session described in section 36 of the Kentucky Constitution, during which
the General Assembly clearly cannot enact legislation.'09
The constitutional issue upon which many of the statutes
were contested in L.R.C. v. Brown was what (if any) legislative
power may an interim legislative committee (specifically the
L.R.C.) exercise after expiration of the sixty-day limit on legislative sessions. 10 The concern arises because "the legislative body

"0

See Act of Mar. 18, 1966, ch. 37, 1966 Ky. Acts 295-347.
Act of Mar. 27, 1968, ch. 201, 1968 Ky. Acts 825-26.

107See

103See Act of Mar. 30, 1972, ch. 375, 1972 Ky. Acts 1640-41.
109See Kenton Amendment, ch. 440, 1978 Ky. Acts 1400-01.
110L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 907, 914-16. Some 1982 statutes premised on
the Kenton Amendment seemed to confer power upon the General Assembly to enact
laws during an organizational session convened in off-numbered years pursuant to KY.
CONST. § 36, including the power to enact a law invalidating any administrative regulation
promulgated since the last regular session of the General Assembly. See Act of Apr. 12,
1982, ch. 443, §§ 11, 12, 13(3), 14, 15, 16(3), 16 (5), 17 (codified at KRS § 6A.090,
.100, .110(3), .120, .130, .140(3), .140(3), .140(5), .150). However, by the plain language
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ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment."' ' I
This issue has been previously litigated in various states when
legislative councils, interim committees and other analogues to
Kentucky's L.R.C. were formed. In every reported decision, the
state appellate courts limited these interim legislative bodies to
a fact-finding and oversight role. The courts invalidated attempts
by interim committees to exercise the lawmaking power by asserting that their acts have the force of law, or to exercise
executive powers by becoming involved in the administration of
2
state government."
of KY. CONST. § 36, the General Assembly, when convened in organizational session
during odd-numbered years, has only the power "of electing legislative leaders, adopting
rules of procedure and the organizing of committees." The purported exercise of any
other power by the General Assembly, when convened pursuant to KY. CoNsT. § 36, is
invalid. L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) Trial Court Opinion and Judgment
at 18. Accordingly, the trial court held the foregoing 1982 statutes giving the legislature
lawmaking powers during the organizational session void pursuant to Ky. CONST. § 26:
The provisions of [certain statutes], insofar as they imply that the General
Assembly, when convened in organizational session, pursuant to Section
36, Ky. Const., may enact statutes or otherwise give force of law to its
enactment when so convened, are void and unenforceable.
Id. at 21 (emphasis supplied).
On appeal, the L.R.C. acquiesced in this holding. Brief for Appellants at 20,
L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
Cf. Trenton Graded School Dist. v. Board of Educ. of Todd County, 129 S.W.2d 143
(Ky. 1939); Stickler v. Higgins, 106 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1937); Richmond v. Lay, 87
S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1935); Royster v. Brock, 79 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1935) (cases relating to
limited lawmaking power during special legislative sessions).
MzJ
664 S.W.2d at 915 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)).
"1
See In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 So. 2d 10 (Ala. 1947); Jewett v. Williams,
369 P.2d 590 (Idaho 1962); State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury, 300 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1957);
State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 543 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1975); General
Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); Advisory Opinion in re Separation of
Powers, 295 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. 1982); State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 S.E.2d 633
(S.C. 1982); State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 191 P.2d 241 (Wash.), cert. denied sub
nom Washington Pension Union v. Washington, 335 U.S. 844 (1948); State ex rel.
Hamblen v. Yelle, 185 P.2d 723 (Wash. 1947).
The cases from Montana provide an excellent example of the evolution of this area
of the law. The Montana Supreme Court initially invalidated its Legislative Council,
holding in State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes, 274 P.2d 611 (Mont. 1954), that the Montana
constitutional provision limiting the legislature to sessions of 60-days' duration prohibited
the exercise of any legislative power, including fact-finding and oversight functions, after
adjournment. This decision was overruled in State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 314 P.2d
849 (Mont. 1957), in which the court upheld the existence of the Legislative Council,
emphasizing that it could do nothing more than engage in fact-finding. When the
Montana legislature later enacted a law giving an interim committee a role in adminis-
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In L.R.C. v. Brown, the legislature contended that the constitutional basis for Kentucky's interim committee system is the

"Kenton Amendment,"" n 3 arguing that it conferred upon the
L.R.C. and its interim committees the power to act legislatively
between legislative sessions." 4 Had the Court held that interim

committees may exercise the lawmaking power, the General Assembly would have become a continuous body composed of the
Senate and House of Representatives for sixty days and the

L.R.C. for the remainder of the biennium."

5

The Court recognized that the Kenton Amendment merely

provides that the General Assembly may convene in odd-numbered years "for the purposes of electing legislative leaders,
adopting rules of procedure and the organizing of commit-

tees.""11 6 The Kenton Amendment does not empower those com-

7
mittees to legislate in the interims between sessions."
The power of a legislature is the power to make laws, although necessary incidents to the lawmaking power are the factfinding function and the informing function. The classic description of "legislative oversight" combines both the fact-finding

function and the informing function of the legislative body.
Legislators often exercise their fact-finding function through
statutory interim committees which investigate the actions of the

executive or judicial branches. They may exercise their informing
function by exposing the results of their investigation to public
scrutiny and debate. Through this process of ventilating issues,

the executive branch may alter what it is doing. Alternatively,
tering the state budget between sessions, that statute was invalidated in State ex rel.
Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 543 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1975).
'3 Act of Mar. 31, 1978, ch. 440, 1978 Ky. Acts 1400-01 (codified at Ky. CONST.
§§ 30a, 31a, 36a, 42a, 256).
114 Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at
33.
"I Id. at 34.
116 See Ky. CONST. § 36.
'" The wording of the Kenton Amendment must be contrasted with the wording
of the "annual sessions amendment" that was defeated three times in the decade
preceding adoption of the Kenton Amendment. The defeated amendment would have
reverted to the language of pre-1891 constitutions and declared the General Assembly
to be "a continuing body." Those words were deleted from the Kenton Amendment,
leaving an historical gloss refuting the L.R.C.'s contention that the Kenton Amendment
was intended to give interim committees lawmaking powers. See notes 106-09 supra and
accompanying text.
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the next session of the General Assembly may exercise its lawmaking power to correct what it perceives as incorrect. Thus,

there is a clear distinction between18 "oversight" in the interim
and "lawmaking" in the interim."
Under section 42 of the Kentucky Constitution, Kentucky

legislators may not exercise the lawmaking power after expiration
of the sixty-day period for legislative sessions. Upon adjournment, Kentucky legislators may exercise only fact-finding and

informing functions, which together constitute "oversight," not
"lawmaking." The constitutional infirmity of the statutes invalidated in L.R.C. V. Brown was their attempt to empower the
L.R.C. to go beyond oversight and exercise the lawmaking power
after the constitutional limit of sixty days. The Court refused to

permit the L.R.C. to be transformed into a fourth branch of
government and to conduct annual sessions through the back

door:
It is patently clear that the LRC as it currently exists, and
as it has existed since 1974, is as appellants concede, an "arm"
of the General Assembly. It is beyond cavil that the primary
role, if not the exclusive role, of the LRC has been historically
that of a research, fact-finding, secretariat and general support
The legislative power
agency for the General Assembly ....
A similar case arose when Alabama amended its constitution in 1947 to add an
organizational session. Pursuant to that amendment, which is identical to Kentucky's
Kenton Amendment, the Alabama legislature created interim committees. Suit was
brought contending that these committees violated the prohibition against the legislative
action after adjournment of either an organizational or regular session. The Alabama
Supreme Court held:
An interim committee does not legislate, it merely makes inquiry and
obtains data so that it may properly report to the regular session their
findings. This, in our opinion, is not doing business within the meaning
of the constitutional provision above noted, but is merely in preparation
to that end when the Legislature reconvenes in its regular session.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 29 So. 2d at 13.
The L.R.C. erroneously cited this Alabama opinion for the proposition that, even
absent the Kenton Amendment, the inherent powers of the General Assembly would
enable it to confer upon the L.R.C. those powers conferred by the challenged 1982
statutes. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 26. That is obviously a misreading
of the Alabama case which involved implementation of an organizational sessions
amendment identical to the Kenton Amendment and not the exercise of any inherent
legislative power. See AiA. CoNsT. § 1901.
" See generally 664 S.W.2d at 915-17.
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lies solely within the province of the General Assembly and its
entire, publicly elected membership. Our constitution makes
that clear. Ky. Const. Sec. 29 states, "[T]he legislative power
shall be vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate,
which, together shall be styled the 'General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky'." Whatever else the LRC may
constitutionally do, it may not-legislate.
Two major legal questions dominate this area: (1) can the
General Assembly delegate its authority to legislate to the LRC
and (2) can the General Assembly legislate through its agent,
the LRC, while the General Assembly is in adjournment? The
answers to these legal questions are inextricably intertwined
and relate to the nature and role of the LRC.
KRS 7.090(1) declares that the LRC is an "independent"
agency of state government. This does not comport with our
previous analysis of the nature of the LRC, nor does it comport with our constitution which recognizes only three branches
of government.
There is, simply put, no fourth branch of government.
The LRC was created by, is controlled by, and is a service
type agency of the General Assembly. It is independent of the
Governor; it is not subject to reorganization by the Governor,
it is subject to the control of its creator, the General Assembly.
It is an "oversight" and service organization for and on behalf
of the General Assembly. As such, it is a part, albeit an
important part, of the General Assembly, the legislative branch
of government. It is part of the General Assembly by reason
of its statutory birth and its statutory nourishing. We therefore, conclude that KRS 7.090(1), which declares the LRC to
be an independent agency of state government is constitutionally invalid." 19
In sum, the Court placed its imprimatur upon the "play in
the joints" which the executive and legislative departments had
long permitted by acquiescence. Relying sub silentio upon the

"I Id. at 911, 914, 916-17 (emphasis both in original and added) (footnotes omitted).

1984-851

SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS

Kenton Amendment to disregard Shanks v. Julian,12 the Court
permitted the L.R.C. to exist as an agency of the legislative
department and to engage in the service and fact-finding functions inherent in its support role.121 Upholding the statute which
exempts the L.R.C. from reorganization by the Governor' 22 was
simply a reiteration of the holding in Brown v. Barkley'23 that
the Governor has no inherent power to reorganize government
and has only the reorganization powers conferred by statute.
Thus, while the L.R.C. is an agency controlled by the legislature,
its powers have been properly limited to lending administrative
support to legislators.
C. Palmores Prelude Opinions
L.R.C. v. Brown was the third chapter in a separation of
powers trilogy decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court during
the Brown administration. The first two opinions, both written
by then Chief Justice John S. Palmore, were Ex parte Auditor
of Public Accounts'2 and Brown v. Barkley.12 These opinions
are important to understanding L.R.C. v. Brown, not only because they were decided in chronological proximity to it, but
also because they obviously encouraged members of (and attorneys for) the General Assembly to believe that the legislation
26
they enacted in 1982 would be upheld by the Palmore Court.
1. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts
The precise issue in Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts
was whether the elected Auditor of Public Accounts could audit
the books and records of the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA). 27
'- 280 S.W. 1081 (Ky. 1926). See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra for a

discussion of the case.
"I

See 664 S.W.2d at 917. See notes 285-91 infra and accompanying text for a

discussion of the legality of interim committees in conjunction with a discussion of the
Adjournment Clause.
See 664 S.W.2d at 917.
628 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1982).
609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980).
628 S.W.2d 616.
'1

See notes 192-205 infra and accompanying text.

1 609 S.W.2d at 682.
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Kentucky has an integrated bar, so all practicing attorneys must
pay dues to the KBA. The Auditor argued that these dues are
therefore in the nature of occupational license taxes exacted by
the Court through the Association, making them public funds.'2
The Auditor contended that he had the constitutional and sta9
tutory right and obligation to audit these allegedly public funds.2
The Court held that the Auditor may audit any general fund
monies appropriated to the judiciary by the legislature, but may
not audit those revenues, including bar association dues, raised
independently by the Court of Justice. 30 The Court reasoned

that the language of the 1975 constitutional amendment known
as the Judicial Article vested plenary control of the Court of

Justice and the bar association in the Supreme Court. 3 '

Instead of deciding the precise issue presented, the Court

seized the opportunity to sound a clarion call asserting its own
independence from the other two branches of government, particularly its fiscal independence from the Governor. 32 In so

doing, the Court wrote an essay on the separation of powers 33
which served as a prelude to L.R.C. v. Brown. 34 It also discussed
the powers of lesser Executive Officers 135 in a fashion which
served as a prelude to Brown v. Barkley,16 and analyzed the

Id. at 683-84.

'2

'19 The

Auditor had filed the case directly with the Kentucky Supreme Court. The
Court held that there was an actual case or controversy, so its opinion was not advisory,
and that, since the Court was a disputant, no lower court had jurisdiction. Id. at 683.
30See id.
13 See id. at 684.

See id. at 686. The Court asserted:

j32

Id.

What we have in this case ... are funds that have not been collected
pursuant to any statute and have not been appropriated by the legislative
body and are not subject to legislative appropriation. Both the Association
and the Board of Bar Examiners exist solely by virtue of rules of this
Court expressly and exclusively authorized by Const. Sec. 116. There is no
constitutional authority by which they can be made accountable to either
of the other two branches of government except for their stewardship of
such funds or property as may come into their possession through [appropriations from the General Assembly].
33

See id. at 684-85.

134

664 S.W.2d at 911-14.

131

See 609 S.W.2d at 686-87.

116

628 S.W.2d at 621-22.
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Court's power over its own budget 137 in a manner repeated in
1 38
L.R.C. v. Brown.

In its discussion of the separation of powers, the Court
emphasized the clarity of Kentucky's constitutional separation
of powers provisions. 39 However, the Court then proceeded to
denigrate the power of the Governor in language that cropped
up in both Brown v. Barkley and L.R.C. v. Brown:
Sections 69-108 ...provide for the executive branch of government and delegate certain specific and exclusive powers to
its officers. Any further powers this branch of government
may possess-that is, beyond those expressly delegated or necessarily implied by the Constitution itself-must be conferred
upon it by the legislative branch, which has all governmental
authority not delegated elsewhere and not prohibited by the
Constitution. 140

In a prelude to its holding in Brown v. Barkley that the
lesser Executive Officers have only those powers delegated to
them by the legislature, 14 1 the Court also denigrated the power

of the Auditor of Public Accounts.142
See 609 S.W.2d at 685.
11 See 664 S.W.2d at 926-28.
,' See 609 S.W.2d at 684-85. The Court said:
IT]he Constitution ...divide[s] all governmental authority among "three
distinct departments, and each of them to be confined to a separate body
11

of magistracy. . .

."

Const. Sec. 27. This distribution of authority con-

cludes with an unusually forceful command: "No person or collection of
persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expresssly directed or permitted." Const. Sec. 28.
Id. (emphasis added). Governor Brown quoted a portion of this language in his brief in
L.R.C. v. Brown. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 16.
,40
609 S.W.2d at 685 (emphasis added). See notes 195-205 infra and accompanying
text.

tx See 628 S.W.2d at 624.
141See 609 S.W.2d at 686-87. The Court said:
As we have previously demonstrated, the duties and responsibilities of the
Auditor are those and only those legally prescribed by the legislature.
Consequently, he has no inherent powers. For example, prior to the effective date of the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1936, KS 4618-68 et
seq., the Auditor served only as the bookkeeper for the state. KS 4618137 et seq. He had no authority or duty to conduct post or performance
audits. These were the function of the State Inspector and Examiner. KS
1992b-59. The effect of the reorganization act was to transfer the duties
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Finally, the Court seemed to go out of its way in Ex parte
Auditor to assert its own control over the judicial budget. The
Court of Justice, like all other arms of state government, was
suffering from the revenue shortfall during Governor Brown's
tenure. The Court used this case to set forth as constitutional
dictum its view that the Chief Justice, not the Governor, controls
143
the judicial budget.
In sum, Ex parte Auditor was the antithesis of judicial
restraint. It resolved a rather narrow issue with so broad a brush
that the opinion unnecessarily opened several new constitutional
issues, one of which would soon be resolved in Brown v. Bark-

ley.
2.

Brown v. Barkley

If hard cases make bad law, then unnecessary cases make
even worse law. Brown v. Barkley should never have been litigated and, not surprisingly, sowed the seeds of bad law. Fortunately, however, the bad law was never harvested because the
Court overruled Brown v. Barkley's troublesome dicta, albeit
sub silentio, in L.R.C. v. Brown.1 44
of Auditor to the Department of Finance, to transfer the duties of the
State Inspector and Examiner to the Auditor, and to abolish the office of
State Inspector and Examiner. A clearer history of subjugation to the
legislature cannot be found.
Id. at 687.
,4' See id. at 685. The Court stated:
[W]hereas the Governor's authority with regard to the presentation of a
biennial budget to the General Assembly is purely statutory ... the authority of the Chief Justice to submit the budget for the Court of Justice
comes directly and expressly from the Constitution itself. Const. Sec.
l10(5)(b). Hence that function can be neither assumed by nor delegated to
the executive branch.
The purpose and significance of the judicial budget is that it provides
a means by which the legislative body may assess how much it must
appropriate from the treasury for the operation of the judicial system.
Once it has made that appropriation, the authority for and responsibility
of determining the necessity for and the propriety of expenditures from
that source rest exclusively with the judicial branch itself, and are not
subject to executive or legislative regulation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
" See notes 192-205 infra and accompanying text.
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Brown v. Barkley raised the chicken-and-egg questions inherent in statutes which permit Governors to reorganize the
governmental structure previously created by the legislature. Since
the United States Congress enacted the first executive reorganization act, 45 commentators have disagreed whether such statutes
are constitutional. One viewpoint is "thatgovernment is organized
by statute and the power to reorganize government, being the
power to amend those statutes, is a lawmaking power which
cannot constitutionally be delegated to the chief executive. 46
Another viewpoint is that the chief executive has inherent power
to reorganize executive agencies subservient to him and, therefore, that it is unconstitutional to permit the legislative branch
to retroactively veto such a reorganization by joint resolution.' 47
A third compromise view is that the chief executive has no
inherent reorganization power, but may "faithfully execute" a
law delegating that power to him.' 48 At the federal level, the two
branches of government have seen fit to avoid litigating these
issues. Congress has permitted the President to effectuate reorganizations, and the President has permitted Congress by joint
resolution to veto those reorganizations of which it disapproved.,49
A similar rapprochement existed in Kentucky until the Brown
Administration. Kentucky's first reorganization act was enacted
50
in 1936 during the administration of Governor A.B. Chandler.Y
The statute was unusually sweeping in its scope, permitting, for
example, the abolition of agencies.' 5 ' Because the legislature was

"4 See Reorganization Act of 1932, ch. 314, §§ 401-408, 47 Stat. 413 (repealed

1966).
"6 See Note, Administrative Law-Delegation of Legislative Power to President
Under National Industrial Recovery Act, 12 N.C.L. REv. 44, 44-45 (1933-34).
141 Cf. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the
Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1064 (1981)

(discussing Congressional limitations on the presidential removal power).
141

See Note, supra note 146, at 46.

149

See Nathanson, supra note 147, at 1089. But see E.E.O.C. v. Hernando Bank,

Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190 (5th Cir. 1984) (invalidating legislative veto while upholding
remainder of Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982)).
M See Government Reorganization Act of 1936, CARROLL'S Ky. STAT. ANN. KRS
§§ 4618-68 to -169 (Baldwin 1936).
M See, e.g., KRS §§ 4618-150, -154, -163.
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limited to biennial, sixty-day sessions, this statute gave the Governor virtually unlimited power to reshape state government.
Only when the legislature reconvened biennially could it veto a
Governor's reorganization of state government. Because the reorganization had become the status quo by that time, it was
virtually impossible politically to unscramble the eggs.
The event that led to the litigation in Brown v. Barkley was
Governor Brown's attempt to reorganize the Department of
Agriculture, a department headed by an elected constitutional
officer. The threshold issue in the case was whether KRS section
12.025(1)152 authorized the Governor to undertake such an ac53
tion.
When enacted in 1960, KRS section 12.020 divided state
agencies into three categories: "Constitutional Administrative
Departments" headed by an elected constitutional officer, "Statutory Administrative Departments" reporting to the Governor
and "Independent Agencies.' ' 54 The Court stated that, when
enacted in 1960, the Governor's power to reorganize state agencies under KRS section 12.025(1) did not extend "to those departments, including Agriculture, that were classified in KRS
12.020 as 'constitutional' rather than 'statutory." '15 5 The Court
observed that, as enacted in 1960, the reorganization powers
contained in KRS section 12.025(1) referred only to "statutory
administrative departments" and not to "constitutional admin' 56
istrative departments.'
Over the next twenty years the reorganization statute was
amended several times, with resulting changes in the names of
the categories of departments. 57 However, the 1980 General
Assembly added a proviso to KRS section 12.020, which the
Court construed to say that the Governor could not, "under
KRS 12.025, transfer functions, funds, personnel, etc.," from

152 KRS § 12.025 repealed by Acts of 1982, ch. 447, § 23, effective Jan. 1, 1984,
states in pertinent part: "[Tihe governor may ... (1) [e]stablish, abolish or alter the
organization of any agency or statutory administrative department ..
151Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 619.
'-

Id.

See id.
Id.
"I Id. at 619-20.

1
'
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an administrative body headed by a "constitutionally elected
officer."'15 8 Governor Brown argued that Agriculture was a statutory administrative department and, hence, within the scope
of his reorganization powers. 15 9 The Court agreed that Agriculture and every other executive department were statutory in the
sense of being created by statute. 16° However, the Court held
that the General Assembly had not intended in 1960 to classify
departments headed by elected constitutional officers as statutory
departments for the purposes of the reorganization act and that
61
the 1980 proviso reaffirmed this intent.1
The case should have ended on this issue of statutory interpretation. However, the Court was obliged to consider Governor
Brown's argument that the power to reorganize the executive
branch of government was an inherent executive power which
could not be limited by the General Assembly.1 62 He argued that
despite contrary legislation by the General Assembly, "the supreme executive power" conferred upon the Governor by section
69 of the Kentucky Constitution permitted him to reorganize
departments headed by lesser Executive Officers. 63 In making
this contention, the Governor ignored the homily that certain
aspects of our constitutional system of government depend upon
compromise and are too fragile to be litigated to their logical
conclusions. When the Governor asserted an unbridled constitutional prerogative to abolish state agencies, he risked a holding
by the Court that reorganization is a legislative power that can
never be delegated to the Governor. Fortunately, the Court did
not choose between extremes; it left the Governor those reor164
ganization powers conferred upon the office by statute.
In deciding whether the Governor has inherent power to
reorganize the executive branch, or only has such reorganization
powers as are statutorily conferred upon the office, the Court
in Barkley reached the politically and constitutionally solomonic

"I Id. at 620.
159Id.
110See

id. at 620 n.8.
See id. at 620.

16,

Id. at 622.
Id. at 620-22.

164

See id. at 623.

"
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conclusion that, while the power to reorganize government is
executive in nature, it exists only to the extent created by stat-

ute. 65 Since the General Assembly has already organized the
government, the Governor cannot displace that organization
without enabling legislation. 16
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court made several
statements of constitutional law that were so unnecessarily
sweeping in their scope that they inevitably led to the enactment
of the 1982 statutes which produced the litigation in L.R.C. v.

Brown.' 67 For example, in Brown v. Barkley, the Court embellished the analysis first mentioned in ExparteAuditor of Public
Accounts,6 8 that is, Executive Officers other than the Governor
'6 Despite the holding in Brown v. Barkley that reorganization is an executive
power, the opinion in L.R.C. v. Brown refers to it as legislative in nature. See L.R.C.
v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 930.
16

The Court stated:

Whether the Governor, in the exercise of his authority as the "supreme executive power of the Commonwealth" (Const. Sec. 69), can do
the same thing in the absence of legislative authority is another matter.
Though we are satisfied that the transfer of an existing, legislatively-created
function from one executive agency or department to another is essentially
an executive action ... and is not an exercise of legislative power by the
chief executive, we do not believe that the chief executive has the power
to do it without legislative sanction unless it is necessary in order for him
to carry out a law or laws that the legislature has created without prescribing in sufficient detail how they are to be executed.
...
We do not doubt that if the General Assembly should pass a law
that requires implementation, and appropriate funds for that purpose but
omit specifying the manner in which it is to be carried out, the chief
executive would be required to carry it out and have the right to choose
the means by which to do it. That would not be so because of any implied
or inherent power, however, but because it would be within the scope of
authority and duty expressly conferred upon him by Const. Sec. 81.
In any event, whether the problem be largely semantic or otherwise,
if it be postulated that the chief executive does possess implied or "inherent" powers, they would be subordinate to statute, as the inherent prerogatives of the Attorney-General were so held in Johnson v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942). This means, we think, that when the
General Assembly has placed a function, power or duty in one place there
is no authority in the Governor to move it elsewhere unless the General
Assembly gives him that authority. And in this case, as we have indicated
already, KRS 12.025 does not give him that authority.
628 S.W.2d at 622-23.
167 See notes 223-26 infra and accompanying text.
366 See 609 S.W.2d at 687.
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are geldings, having only those powers conferred upon them by
the General Assembly. 169 The Court further held that the General
Assembly could diffuse executive power among these elected
Executive Officers and thereby weaken the Governor. 170 The
Court noted that once those functions are conferred by the
legislature, the empowered Executive Officers may discharge
them without any interference by the Governor. 17 1 This question
had never before been litigated in Kentucky and therefore constituted a considerable diminution of the power and influence
previously possessed by the Governor. The Court's opinion ap-

pears to be constitutionally sound; the unsoundness of Brown
v. Barkley inheres in Governor Brown's decision to litigate the

issue. 172
The Court observed:
It is interesting to observe that in dealing with the General Assembly, and
with the office of Governor the Constitution speaks in terms of "powers,"
but with regard to the Sec. 91 officers mentions only "duties" and "responsibilities." Except for the Attorney-General ... and ... Secretary of
State ....
the other officers named in Const. See. 91 have only such
powers and responsibilities as are prescribed by statute....
628 S.W.2d at 622.
I'l The Court stated:
[Tihese independent executive offices provide convenient receptacles for
the diffusion of executive power. As the Governor is the "supreme executive power," it is not possible for the General Assembly to create another
executive officer or officers who will not be subject to that supremacy,
but it definitely has the prerogative of withholding executive powers from
him by assigningthem to these constitutionalofficers who are not amenable
to his supervision and control.
,id. (emphasis added).
"' The Court noted:
To round out this analysis of the respective powers and duties of the
Governor, the General Assembly, and the officers established by Const.
Sec. 91, we need to consider the relationship between the Governor and
the Const. Sec. 91 officers. That the Const. See. 91 officers are to be
elected by the people suggest that, whatever their duties, they are not
answerable to the supervision of anyone else. This inference finds support
in that provision of our Constitution (Sec. 78) which empowers the Governor to require information in writing from the officers of the executive
branch upon any subject relating to the duties of their offices. Had the
framers of the Constitution intended the Governor to have any further
authority over these officers, Sec. 78 would have been unnecessary and,
indeed, an anomaly.
Id. at 623 (emphasis in original).
,1 The dilemma arises from the fact that Ky. CONST. § 69 grants the Governor
10
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In addition to telling the General Assembly in unambiguous
term.s that it could diffuse the executive powers of the Governor
among the various Executive Officers, the Court proceeded
bluntly to denigrate the power of the Governor in words that
appeared again and again in L.R.C, v. Brown:
It is interesting as well as instructive to consider the constitutional contrast between the executive and judicial branches in
their respective relationships to the legislative branch. Whereas
the judicial branch must be and is largely independent of
the executive branch exists
intrusion by the legislative branch,
73
bidding,
its
do
to
principally
As fate would have it, the opinion in Brown v. Barkley was
rendered on March 5, 1982, when the 1982 General Assembly
was in session considering the bills that were later to be at issue
in L.R.C. v. Brown. 7 4 The dicta in Brown v. Barkley concerning
the separation of governmental powers obviously encouraged the
legislators to enact these bills.
The legislators' enthusiasm was further bolstered by a curious
event which occurred after the Brown v. Barkley opinion was
issued. The Court's original opinion contained the following
statement:
The real power of the executive branch springs directly from
the long periods between legislative sessions, during which
interims the legislature Is powerless to function and must,
perforce, leave broad diseretionarypowers to the chief executive. It is ironic, but a historical fact qf life, that in the past
most chief executives have used this very power, given to them
by the legislature, to influence the actions of individual legislators 175and thus exercise control over the legislative process
itself.

"§upreme executive power" aad therefore all other executive officers Ere "stbject to
that supremacy." See id. Thu4, at what point would diffusion of executive power by
the General Assembly under § 91 violate § 69 prerogatives? Cf,Rouse v, Johnson, 28
5.W.2d 745, 752 (Ky. 1930) (pcrluding thet tie Governor's power to f'Il executive
vacancie4 under § 152 was linitd to vacarwie§ in elective offices),
628 S.W:2d at 623 (emphasis added).
)4See notes 223-26 infra.
,,See Brown v. Barkley, No. 81-SC-592-DG, slip op, t 13-14 (Ky, Mar, 5, 1982).
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Legislative leaders proceeded immediately to interrogate the
Chief Justice about this portion of the opinion when he appeared
before the Appropriations and Revenue Committee on behalf of
the judicial budget. 76 Within a few days, the Court sua sponte
modified the opinion by deleting the statement that the legislature is "powerless to function" in the interims and substituting
the following sentence: "The real power of the executive branch
springs directly from the long periods between legislative sessions, during which interims the legislature customarily has left
broad discretionarypowers to the chief executive.'1 77 The Court's
sua sponte modification of the Barkley opinion, together with
its statements that "the executive branch exists principally to do

its [the legislature's] bidding ' 178 and that "the General Assembly
has all the powers not denied to it or vested elsewhere by the
Constitution,' ' 179 understandably encouraged attorneys advising
the legislature to assume the Palmore Court would uphold the
1982 statutes then being enacted. 80
One primary reason why that prediction was not fulfilled is
the dramatic change in composition of the Supreme Court between Brown v. Barkley and L.R.C. v. Brown. Thus, before
analyzing the portions of the opinion in L.R.C. v.Brown which
overrule sub silentio the aforementioned statements in Brown v.
Barkley, it is important to discuss the historical happenstance of
the Court's change in membership between the rendering of
those two opinions.
3. ProceduralSkirmishes in L.R.C. v. Brown:
Old Court-New Court'8'
In November, 1982, while L.R.C. v. Brown was winding its
way from the trial court to the Supreme Court, four of the

'7'

See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), Mar. 13, 1982, at E7, col. I (Metro ed,).
See 628 S.W.2d at 623 (emphasis added).

Id.

179

Id.
-,For a discussion of the pertinent statutes, see notes 223-26 infra and avc.mpanying text.
'"Cf. ARNDT M. STIcxLEs, THE CarCAL STRUGOLE IN KENTUCKY, 1819-1829
(1929) (discussing a similar "old court-new court" controversy occurring in the early
nineteenth century in Kentucky).
179
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seven seats on the Supreme Court changed hands, with three of
them being won by Judges of the Court of Appeals.
Chief Justice Palmore and Justice Marvin J. Sternberg had
announced their retirement and did not stand for re-election.
The seat vacated by Chief Justice Palmore was won by Court
of Appeals Judge William N. Gant. The seat vacated by Justice
Sternberg was won by Jefferson Circuit Judge Charles M. Leibson. After Justice Robert 0. Lukowsky died, Governor Brown
appointed John J. O'Hara to the Court. O'Hara was defeated
for election, however, by Judge Donald Wintersheimer of the
Court of Appeals. Justice Boyce Clayton was also defeated by
Court of Appeals Judge Roy Vance.
These changes in the Court's composition were significant in
many respects. Chief Justice Palmore and Justice Lukowsky had
intellectually dominated the Palmore Court, with dissenting
opinions being a rare occurrence. Also, when the intermediate
Kentucky Court of Appeals was created in 1975, the friction
between it and the Palmore Court was instantaneous. The Kentucky Supreme Court promulgated rules that denigrated the Court
of Appeals, such as requiring memoranda instead of briefs,'8
preventing the Court from deciding for itself which of its opinions to publish,"' and preventing its judges from sitting in the
districts from which they were elected.84 The Kentucky Supreme
Court also published opinions expressing criticism of Court of
Appeals" opinions in uncharacteristically blunt language. 55 Many
Court watchers therefore predicted that, having chafed under
the Palmore regime, the three justices arriving from the Court
of Appeals would be reluctant to follow the former Chief Justice's excessive rhetoric in Brown v. Barkley.
The change in the Court's composition, however, did not
become effective until December, 1982. The delay produced a
litigation stratagem by the L.R.C. which is an interesting histor-

2 For a discussion of KY. R. ApP. P. 1.095 [hereinafter cited as RAP], see Martin,
Kentucky's New Court of Appeals, 41 Ky. BENCH & B. 8, 29 (April 1977).
M See KRS § 21A.070(19) (Baldwin 1984); Ky. R. Cirv. P. 76.28(4) [hereinafter
cited as CR].
See Ky. S. CT. R. 1.030(7)(b) [hereinafter cited as SCR].
See, e.g., Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 202, 204
(Ky. 1977).
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ical footnote. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure permit the
appellant to bypass the Court of Appeals and move to transfer
the case directly to the Supreme Court. 186 As soon as the trial
87
court entered its judgment, the L.R.C. made such a motion.
Attempting to have its appeal heard by the Palmore Court, the
L.R.C. also moved the Supreme Court to dispense with the
requirement of additional briefs and to permit submission of the
case on the briefs filed in the trial court. The only proceeding
in the Supreme Court would have been an oral argument before
88
the Palmore Court.
The historical footnote is that this request was seriously
considered by some members of the "old Court." There was
even discussion of the old Court and new Court sitting en banc
at oral argument and all eleven Justices joining in the decision,
a stratagem that had no apparent purpose other than permitting
Chief Justice Palmore to author the opinion of the Court after
the expiration of his term.
Attorneys for the executive branch, seeking to avoid that
result, filed a strongly worded response to the motion.'8 9 After
this response was filed, the Court immediately ruled that the
request to dispense with briefs would be denied and the case

See CR 76.18.
The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court was entered Nov. 3, 1982.
The Motion to Transfer Appeal From The Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court was made Nov. 6, 1982. Paragraph 10 of the L.R.C.'s Motion to Transfer
requested that the Supreme Court:
a) Dispense with the requirement of printed briefs required by the
Rules and to accept the briefs filed in the Franklin Circuit Court as the
"

u

briefs in this Court;
b) Rule on this Motion without the necessity of a response to Respondents and to deem said Motion to be controverted;

c) Advance the times for oral arguments, and all other hearings in
this case; and
d) Enter an Order transferring the Record directly from the Franklin

Circuit Court to this honorable Court.
Motion to Transfer Appeal From The Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of

Kentucky at 4, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
"I

The Response said, in part:
The decision this Court will be called upon to make may well serve as a

blueprint for Kentucky's system of government for generations to come.
That decision should not appear to those future generations to be flawed
by having been made with undue haste.
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would proceed under ordinary procedural rules. 190 Thus, the case
was argued to and decided by the new Court.19'

4.

The Sub-Silentio Overruling of Brown v. Barkley
Dicta in L.R.C. v. Brown

Despite the language of section 28 of the Kentucky Consti-

tution directing that each branch may exercise only its own
powers and may not exercise the powers of another branch,
except as expressly permitted by the Constitution, the legislature

argued in L.R.C. v. Brown that the General Assembly may
exercise all governmental powers (whether legislative, executive
or judicial) not expressly reposed in some other body. 192
... [W]ith the impending change in the composition of this Court,
LRC's motion presents a serious issue of judicial administration. Even if
this Court were to so expedite this case that briefing time was curtailed
and oral arguments were heard in early December, preparation of a reasoned opinion adequately explaining this Court's decision to the public
would prevent the parties' petitions for rehearing from being determined
by the Court as presently constituted. Whether the new Court deferred to
its predecessor by denying rehearing, or granted the rehearing, the circumstances would present the unseemly inference that the result in this most
important case could depend more upon the identity of the Justices than
upon neutral principles of law. That appearance should be avoided in every
case, but it should especially be avoided in a case having the political
ramifications that are inherent in this appeal. The only way for the Court
to avoid such an inference is for the Court to handle this case according
to the Rules applicable to other cases.
Response by Respondents to Movant's "Motion to Transfer Appeal From Court of
Appeals to Supreme Court" Filed November 5, And to Advance the Case, Dispense
with Briefs in This Court, Etcetera at 3-4, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
190Order Granting Transfer, Establishing Briefing Requirements and Scheduling
Oral Arguments, Nov. 15, 1982, C.J. Stephens, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky.
1984).
"I'The last significant act of the Palmore Court was to choose Palmore's successor.
Interestingly, it was the new Chief Justice, Robert F. Stephens, who authored L.R.C.
v. Brown.
11 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 16-17. In its Brief, the L.R.C.
asserted "that the legislature possesses all powers and authority to act which are not
specifically denied it by the Constitution and has the authority to act in exercising those
powers." Id. at 17 (citing Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1980); Duke v. Boyd
County, 7 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1928); McCreary v. Fields, 147 S.W. 901 (Ky. 1912); Bullitt
v. Sturgeon, 105 S.W. 468 (Ky. 1907)).
The testimony of the principal sponsors of the statutes contested in this litigation,
especially the testimony of former Speaker Pro Tempore Thomason, clearly evidenced
this misinterpretation of the Constitution:
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The L.R.C. predicated its theory of constitutionality on the
dictum in Brown v. Barkley that "[i]t is axiomatic that under
our Constitution the General Assembly has all powers not denied
to it or vested elsewhere by the Constitution."1 93
The L.R.C. asserted this statement meant that all governmental powers of whatever kind (executive, legislative or judicial)
reside in the General Assembly except where a particular attribute of a power is specifically vested by the Constitution in
another branch of government. 94 The obvious fallacy in the
L.R.C.'s contention was two-fold. First, sections 27 and 28 of
the Kentucky Constitution respectively confine the General Assembly to exercising legislative power and deny it the right to
exercise executive or judicial power. Second, all of the executive
power and all of the judicial power are "vested elsewhere by the
Constitution" 95: section 69 of the Constitution vests the
"[s]upreme executive power in ... the Governor" and section
109 of the Constitution vests "the judicial power.. . exclusively
in one Court of Justice." Thus, after considering the pertinent
constitutional provisions, a literal reading of the excerpt from
Barkley does not support the L.R.C.'s expansive interpretation
of it.
The cases relied upon by the L.R.C. actually stand for the
proposition that the General Assembly, in exercising its lawmaking power, may legislate on any subject in any manner except
A. (Mr. Thomason): I don't think there is a constitutional provision that
specifically relates to the Legislature. I think it's the absence of a constitutianal provision that allows the Legislature to create the Legislative
Research Commission, because all other powers ... reside in the Legislature that are not specifically granted to the Executive or Judicial Branch.
Q. 13 (Mr. Combs): Would you agree that the Legislature only has legislative function?
A. Under the Consitition as interpreted recently in the Brown versus Barkley decision, I would say that the Legislature has all functions that are not
specifically granted to the Governor or that are not specifically granted to
the Judicial Branch. All other powers are inherent in the Legislature.
Whether you term them legislative functions or whatever they're still in
the Legislature.
Trial Record at 125-26, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). These legislators
obviously read Brown v. Barkley literally and based all the statutes contested in L.R.C.
v. Brown upon the resulting misinterpretation of the Constitution.
628 S.W.2d at 623 (emphasis added). Cf. Exparte Auditor, 609 S.W.2d at 684.
"' See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 16-17.
191628 S.W.2d at 623.
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insofar as the Constitution restrains the lawmaking power.'1
The L.R.C.'s interpretation of these cases had been rejected in
97 In Sibert,
Sibert v. Garrett.1
the General Assembly had enacted
a statute arrogating the executive power of appointing members
of an agency of the executive branch. The Court rejected the
same argument which the L.R.C. would later extrapolate from
Brown v. Barkley, saying:
IT]he Legislature may perform all legislative acts not expressly
or by necessary implication withheld from it, but it may not
perform or undertake to perform executive or judicial acts,
except in such instances as may be expressly or by necessary
implication directed or permitted by the Constitution of the
particular state. To adopt the latitudinous construction that
the Legislature may do anything not expressly or impliedly
prohibited by the Constitution would to our minds at once
destroy the separation of the powers of government int6 the
three great departments. 98
In L.R.C. v. Brown, the Court had to reconcile Sibert and
Barkley. Chief Justice Stephens deftly accomplished that task by
reasserting the rationale of Sibert and overruling the obiter dictum in Barkley, while stating that nothing in Barkley could
reasonably be read to contradict Sibert:
Appellants urge this court to adopt a so-called liberal
construction of the separation of powers doctrine and argue
that the General Assembly is the "dominant" branch of government. In support of this argument, they claim that in Brown
v. Barkley. ... we denigrated the power of the Governor and
gave the General Assembly a dominant role in the tripod, by
allegedly giving to the General Assembly all "residual" powers.
We do not agree and we do not so interpret Barkley.
In Barkley, following a lengthy discussion of the inherent
or implied powers of the Governor, we said:
The extent that the Governor has any implied or inherent
powers in addition to those the Constitution expressly
gives him, it seems clear that such unexpressed executive

See 628 S.W.2d 616; 147 S.W. 901; 105 S.W. 468; 7 S.W.2d 839. See also 664
S.W.2d at 913-14.
1- 246 S.W. 455 (Ky. 1922).
116

M Id. at 457.
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power is subservient to the overriding authority of the
legislature....
Practically speaking, except for those conferred upon him
specifically by the Constitution, his powers like those of
the executive officers created by Const. Sec. 91, are only
what the General Assembly chooses to give him....
These words, plus the following, are seized upon by appellants in their argument as proof that somehow, this Court
has sawed off one of the legs of the tripod, viz., that of the
executive, and that we have made that branch of government
less than equal to the other two branches. Appellants remind
us that we also said in Barkley:
It is axiomatic that under our Constitution the GeneralAssembly has all powers not denied to it or vested elsewhere by the
Constitution.... Whereas the judicial branch must be and is
largely independent of intrusion by the legislative branch, the
executive branch exists principally to do its [the legislature's]
bidding....
The inference appellants draw from this language is that the
General Assembly possesses all powers and authority to act
which are not specifically denied it by the Constitution and
has the authority to act in exercising those powers. It is argued
that all powers, residual in nature, belong to the legislative
branch. We do not agree.
To place this interpretation on that language would be
tantamount to saying that we were repealing Sections 27 and
28 of the Kentucky Constitution. We would in effect be eliminating the separation of powers doctrine. We would reach a
result which would fly in the face of history and the legal
precedents of this Commonwealth. Our review of that doctrine's history and our description of its language most assuredly confirm this. Nothing in Barkley can be construed to
deny the existence of the doctrine of separation of powers and
the equality of the three coparceners in government. Implicit
in Barkley is that the General Assembly as the legislative
branch, has all powers which are solely and exclusively legislative in nature. To argue that any other power is given to the
General Assembly simply won't wash. The power referred to
in Barkley is legislative power and legislative power only. 99

1" 664 S.W.2d at 913.
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When the provisions of Kentucky's Constitution are consid-

ered together, ° it is clear that the legislative, executive and
judicial powers are delegated exclusively to the legislative, executive and judicial branches, respectively. The sole exceptions to
this rule are those instances in which the Constitution "expressly" provides otherwise. 201 Accordingly, except in those instances where the Constitution expressly confers an executive or

judicial power upon the General Assembly, it may exercise only
20 2
legislative power.

The other basis upon which the L.R.C. asserted the validity
of the 1982 statutes was its contention that the Governor is but

a conduit through which the legislature controls state government. 203 This view rested on Palmore's statement in Brown v.
Barkley that the Governor "exists principally to do its [the
4 But the notion
legislature's] bidding.''20
that the Governor is

merely an agent of the General Assembly was as erroneous as it
was audacious. The Office of Governor exists to faithfully execute the laws enacted by the General Assembly. 205 Thus, the
executive branch is an agent of the law, not of the legislature.

11See Ky.

CONST. §§ 27, 28, 29, 69, 109.
See KY. CONST. § 28. There are instances in which the Constitution expressly
deviates from a pure separation of powers. For example, the judicial power to try
impeachments is given to the Senate. See KY. CoNsT. § 67. That does not mean that
governmental powers cannot be classified as intrinsically executive, legislative or judicial.
It means only that the Constitutional Convention chose to allocate those particular
functions to a particular branch. To make sure those would be the only deviations from
the principle of separating powers, the framers included § 28.
As stated by the Court in Pratt v. Breckinridge, 65 S.W. 136 (Ky. 1901):
From this it seems clear that the makers of the constitution intended the
legislature to discuss and enact laws, and to do nothing else. ...
It Is not to be supposed for a moment that, in vesting the general
assembly with legislative power, it was imagined by the convention or the
people that that body, by the mere passage of a so-called act conferring
upon itself powers which properly belonged to the other departments, could
usurp their functions. If it can do so, then we do not live under a
constitutional government, but the general assembly, like the British parliament, is supreme.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
23 See 664 S.W.2d at 913.
201

204

See 628 S.W.2d at 623.

203

Ky. CONSr. § 81. See 664 S.W.2d at 919.
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II.

THE OPINION IN L.R.C. v. Brown:
"KENTUCKY'S Marbury v. Madison"

After Governor Brown's vetoes were overridden, the lawsuit
was commenced on June 14, 1982, when the L.R.C. filed a
petition for a declaration that the various statutes were enforceable. 20 Governor Brown and Attorney General Beshear filed a
counterclaim impleading additional statutes in order to ensure
resolution of the entire controversy. 20 7
The Court rejected the common description of the controversy as a power struggle between the executive and legislative
branches. Instead the Court correctly analyzed the issue as
whether the General Assembly could delegate to the L.R.C.
certain powers to be exercised while the General Assembly is
adjourned. 20 The fundamental question presented in L.R.C. v.
Brown related primarily to the constitutional role of the L.R.C.
in state government and secondarily to the scope of the Governor's duty to faithfully execute the laws.
A.

The Fundamental ConstitutionalPrinciples

The dispositive questions in L.R.C. v. Brown related predominantly to two principles: (1) the separation of governmental
powers mandated by sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution and (2) the sixty-day limit on the General Assembly's
biennial sessions and the constitutional requirement of bicameralism. Accordingly, before discussing the statutes which the Court
invalidated, it is necessary to analyze these basic constitutional
principles.
20 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 13; statutes cited infra notes 223-26
and accompanying text.
21 "In their pleadings, all parties admitted that there was a justiciable controversy
presented as to each statute impleaded. A two-day evidentiary hearing was held before
the Franklin Circuit Court ... in which members of the legislature and members of the
Governor's Cabinet testified regarding their understanding of the meaning and practical
effect of the contested statutory provisions. Following that, all parties submitted detailed

briefs, and oral arguments were heard. On November 3, 1982, Judge Williams rendered
his Opinion and Judgment," invalidating every statute at issue. Brief for Appellees,
supra note 93, at 13-14. The L.R.C. appealed and the appeal was transferred directly
to the Supreme Court on Appellants' motion. Id. at 14. See notes 186-88 supra and

accompanying text.
See L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Ky. 1984).
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1. The Separation of Powers ProvisionsAre
Strictly Construed in Kentucky
The provision expressly incorporating the doctrine of sepa-

ration of governmental powers into Kentucky's Constitution was
drafted by Thomas Jefferson, 20 9 and composed the first two
paragraphs of Kentucky's first, second and third Constitutions. 210 Jefferson's words appear in the present Constitution of
Kentucky immediately after the Bill of Rights 2 I and form "an

212
unusually forceful" Separation of Powers Clause.
Despite the clarity of Kentucky's separation of powers doc-

trine, the L.R.C. contended that the provisions should be lib-

The significance of Jefferson's authorship is that the Constitution of the United
States does not contain an express separation of powers provision such as KY. CONsr.
§§ 27, 28. In fact the federal Constitution, drafted principally by James Madison,
contained neither a Bill of Rights nor an express separation of powers provision. These
were the two principal objections of Thomas Jefferson to Madison's document. See THE
FEDERALIST,

Nos. 47, 48 (J. Madison). Contra Tim

FEDERALIST,

No. 50 (A. Hamilton).

The First Congress submitted the Bill of Rights to the States as the first ten amendments
to the federal Constitution. However, Jefferson's other proposed amendment, an express
separation of powers provision, was not added to the federal Constitution. It is against
that historical backdrop that one must judge the importance of the fact that Thomas
Jefferson personally wrote Kentucky's separation of powers provisions. A detailed account of Jefferson's authorship of this provision is contained in Commissioners of
Sinking Fund v. George, 47 S.W. 779, 785 (Ky. 1898) (Du Relle, J., dissenting). See
also Rouse v. Johnson, 28 S.W.2d 745, 752 (Ky. 1930) (Willis, J., dissenting).
210 See Ky. CONST. of 1792 art. I, §§ 1, 2; Ky. CONST. of 1799 art. I, §§ 1, 2; Ky.
CONST. of 1850 art. I, §§ 1, 2.
2, See Ky. CoNsT. §§ 27, 28 which are set out in note 41 supra.
212Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. 1980). See also
Sibert v. Garrett, 246 S.W. 455 (Ky. 1922). In Sibert, the Court stated:
Perhaps no state forming a part of the national government of the United
States has a Constitution whose language more emphatically separates and
perpetuates what might be termed the American tripod form of government
than does our Constitution, which history tells us came from the pen of
the great declaimer of American independence, Thomas Jefferson, when
delegates from Kentucky, just after it was admitted to the Union, waited
upon him, and he penned for them the substance of what is now section
28 ... of our Constitution, containing an affirmative prohibition against
one department exercising powers properly belonging to the others, and
which without it contained only the negative prohibition found in section
27 of that instrument, and which was the extent of the separation of the
powers found in the federal Constitution and in those of a number of the
states composing the confederated Union at that time.
Id. at 457.
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erally construed in the modern era. 21 3 The Supreme Court of

Kentucky was not persuaded: "[lt has been our view, in interpreting Sections 27 and 28, that the separation of powers doc-

trine is fundamental to Kentucky's tri-partite system of
government and must be 'strictly construed.'

"214

The Court was not called upon in L.R.C. v. Brown to apply

a political science concept of checks and balances, nor was it
required to adjust that amorphous concept to changing times.
Quite the contrary, the Court was called upon to apply the plain

and "unusually forceful" language of sections 27 and 28 of the
Kentucky Constitution to the statutes enacted by the 1982 Gen215
eral Assembly.

L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 910. In making this argument, the L.R.C.
relied exclusively upon Kansas and New Hampshire cases-State ex rel. Schneider v.
Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 791 (Kan. 1976) and Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 786
(N.H. 1981)-for the contention that the doctrine of separation of powers should be
liberally construed in the modem era. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 1314. However, "the Constitution of Kansas contains no express provision requiring the
separation of powers," 547 P.2d at 790, and the New Hampshire Constitution contains
perhaps the weakest separation of powers provision in the country. See N.H. CoNsT.
pt. I, art. 37 ("the three essential powers [of government] ... ought to be kept as
separate from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free government will
admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of
the Constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity"). Obviously, these cases
were not authority for construing the "unusually forceful" language of KY. CONSr. §§
27, 28. See e.g., State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 799-800 (Me. 1982) (Federal separation
of powers cases are not authority for construction of the Maine Constitution because,
unlike the federal Constitution, the Maine Constitution has an express separation of
powers provision.).
The L.R.C.'s argument also overlooked the fact that there are two types of
sephration of powers cases: (1) cases in which one branch of government usurps powers
properly belonging to another branch of government; and (2) cases in which one branch
of government exercises powers properly belonging to it, but encroaches upon the
responsibilities of a coequal branch of government in the course of exercising its rightful
powers. An example of a case involving the usurpation of power is the famous steel
mill seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (seizure
of steel mills by Presidential order an unlawful exercise of congressional power). An
example of an encroachment case is United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (grand
jury exercised rightful power of issuing subpoena and President Nixon argued that
subpoena should be quashed because it encroached upon core functions of executive
branch).
- 664 S.W.2d at 912 (quoting Arnett v. Meredith, 121 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1938)).
21 See statutes cited infra notes 223-26.
211 See
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Legislative Action Having Force of Law Must
Comply with All the Constitution'sProcedural
Requirements for Enacting Laws

The American idea of diffusing governmental power was
accomplished not only by separating the government into three
branches, but also by imposing specific limitations upon the

process of enacting laws. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia noted in Consumer Energy Council v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission:2 6 "Perhaps the greatest fear of
the Framers was that in a representative democracy the Legis-

lature would be capable of using its plenary lawmaking power
to swallow up the other departments of the Government.

' '217

The remedies fashioned by the framers were bicameralism
and the executive veto, both of which have become part of the

American form of government 18 and are specifically embodied
in sections 46, 56, and 88 of the Kentucky Constitution. All four
Kentucky Constitutions have embodied the concept of bicameralism and the executive veto. 2 9 These concepts, and the procedures embodied in the Enactment Clause, 220 were intended to
insure that the legislative process is a deliberative one.22 These
constitutional requirements are fatal to any scheme which pur2V6673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). See also THE
No. 46 (J. Madison).
673 F.2d at 464.
See id. at 464-65. The court observed:

FEDERALIST,
217

21

What emerges from our analysis of the purposes of the lawmaking
restrictions in Article I is that the Framers were determined that the
legislative power should be difficult to employ. The requirements of presentation to the President and bicameral concurrence ultimately serve the
same fundamental purpose: to restrict the operation of the legislative power
to those policies which meet the approval of three constituencies, or a
supermajority of two.
Id. at 464.
219 Having as its primary objective limiting the legislative power, the Constitutional
Convention wrote into the present Constitution a number of other preconditions to
exercising the lawmaking power. See Ky. CONST., §§ 37, 46, 51, 55, 56, 59. See also
notes 209-10 supra and accompanying text.
220 Ky. CONST. § 51.
223 Cf. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980) (Alaska
Constitution's procedural requirements for the enactment of legislation are designed to
prevent duplicity and insure a fair hearing and due deliberation). Accord State ex rel.
Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 633 (W. Va. 1981).
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ports to allow a legislative committee, such as the L.R.C., to
exercise the lawmaking power, whether during or between legislative sessions.m2
In sum, the issues in L.R.C. v. Brown involved application
of the Separation of Powers Clauses, the Bicameral Clause, the

Adjournment Clause and the Enactment Clause. Pursuant to a
strict construction of those provisions, the Court invalidated all
the questioned statutes except two relating to the budget process.

B.

The Power of Appointment

Several enactments of the 1982 General Assembly encroached
upon the Governor's power to appoint members of executive
boards and agencies. These statutes generally fell into four groups:

[i] statutes permitting legislators to serve as members of executive
boards and agencies;2 [ii] statutes permitting legislators to appoint members of executive boards and agencies;2 [iii] statutes
permitting the L.R.C. or an interim committee to exercise power
of advice and consent over gubernatorial appointments in the
interim between legislative sessions;2 and [iv] statutes requiring
the Governor to choose his appointees from lists composed by

legislators.2 6 The decision in L.R.C v. Brown invalidated all of
these statutes.
21 Cf. 606 P.2d at 773 ("[W]hen the legislature wishes to act in an advisory

capacity it may act by resolution. However, when it means to take action having a
binding effect upon those outside the legislature, it may do so only by following the
enactment procedures.")
- See KRS § 151.560(l)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (requiring Governor to appoint two
members of General Assembly to the Flood Control Advisory Commission); KRS §
154.675(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (Speaker and President Pro Tempore made ex officio
members of the Enterprise Zone Authority).
m The statutes permitting the Speaker of the House of Representatives and/or the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate to appoint one or more members of boards and
agencies within the executive department included: KRS § 31.015(l)(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp.
1983) (Public Advocacy Commission); KRS § 42.500 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (State Investment Commission); KRS § 103.2101(1)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (Industrial Revenue
Bond Oversight Committee); KRS § 117.015(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (State Board of
Elections); KRS § 163.505 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (Commission on Deaf and Hearing
Impaired); KRS § 164.010 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (Council on Higher Education); KRS §
174.105(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (Motor Carrier Regulatory Board); KRS § 230.220(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1983) (State Racing Commission); KRS § 230.620 (Cum. Supp. 1983)
(Kentucky Harness Racing Commission); KRS § 247.090(l)(f) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (State
Fair Board); KRS § 441.615(l)(g) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (Kentucky Local Correction Facil-
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1. Statutes Empowering the Speaker and PresidentPro
Tempore to Appoint Members of Executive Agencies Violate
the Separation of Powers Clauses
The Kentucky Constitution does not contain an Appointments Clause. Indeed, there was an Appointments Clause in the
Constitution as submitted by the 1890 Convention to the voters,
but when the Convention reconvened after the referendum, it
deleted the Appointments Clause.227 As approved, section 93 of
the Constitution, which provides for the constitutional officers,
Governor and Lieutentant Governor, states:
The duties and responsibilities of these officers shall be prescribed by law, and all fees collected by any of said officers
shall be covered into the treasury. Inferior State officers, not
specifically provided for in this Constitution, may be appointed
or elected, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, for a
term not exceeding four years, and until their successors are
appointed or elected and qualified. 228
The L.R.C. contended that, in the absence of an Appointments
Clause, section 93 gives the General Assembly not only the power
to prescribe the method by which executive officers are to be
selected, but also the power to appoint those Executive Officers.2 9 However literally sensible that interpretation might be, it
is completely inconsistent with the "unusually forceful" separation of powers provisions contained in the Kentucky Consti20
tution.

It is generally recognized that the power to appoint Executive
Officers is inherently executive, and that to hold otherwise is to
ities Construction Authority). See also, KRS § 151.560(I)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (L.R.C.
authorized to appoint nine members of the Flood Control Advisory Commission); KRS
§ 153.380(3) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (L.R.C. authorized to appoint five members of the
Kentucky Oral History Commission).
- See KRS § 248.510(1)(b) (1981) (Kentucky Tobacco Research Board); KRS §
278.050(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (Public Service Commission).
226 See KRS § 18A.050(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (State Personnel Board); KRS §
151.560(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (Flood Control Advisory Commission).
21 See note 59 supra.
2u Ky. CONST. § 93.
210

See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 32-33.
See Ky. CoNsT. §§ 27, 28. See also notes 209-15 supra and accompanying text.
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deprive the Chief Executive of the right to control his own
branch of government. 231 The Governor's obligation to faithfully
execute the law implies, as a necessary incident, the power to
appoint those who will act under his direction in discharging
this obligation.

23 2

L.R.C. v. Brown was not the first case in which it was
argued that section 93 should be interpreted to permit the Speaker
and President Pro Tempore to appoint members of executive
agencies. In fact, the same argument was rejected in Sibert v.
Garrett. 3 In a post-Sibert decision, Judge Simeon Willis stated:
"It is settled in this state that ... the appointment to a state
office is an executive function .... ,,234
The L.R.C.'s hopes of getting Sibert v. Garrett overruled
did not rest solely upon the Palmore Court's constitutional
viewpoint as expressed in Brown v. Barkley that the executive
branch exists principally to serve the legislature. It also rested
upon the Court's previously inconsistent interpretations of section 93. In advancing this argument and asking that Sibert be
overruled, the L.R.C. was merely asking that precedents adopted
prior to Sibert be reinstated.
The earliest interpretations of section 93 came during the
tumultuous political era of 1898-1901 that culminated in the
assassination of William Goebel. 235 The first case that interpreted
"ISee,
232

e.g., Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928).

Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). The Supreme Court

observed:
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant
of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided
could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of
subordinates.... As he is charged specifically to take care that they be
faithfully executed, the responsible implication, even in the absence of
express words, was that as part of his executive power he should select
those who were to act for him under his direction in the execution of the
laws.
Id. (citations omitted).
21
See 246 S.W. at 458.
See Rouse v. Johnson, 28 S.W.2d 745, 752 (Ky. 1930) (Willis, J., dissenting).
23
See Poyntz v. Shackelford, 54 S.W. 855, 856-58 (Ky. 1900) (members of State
Board of Election Commissioners to appoint new Commissioners to fill vacancies);
Purnell v. Mann, 48 S.W. 407, 410 (Ky. 1898) (legislature to appoint members of State
Board of Election Commissioners); Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. George, 47 S.W.
779, 781-82 (Ky. 1898) (legislature may appoint members of the Board of Penitentiary
Commissioners).
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section 93 was Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. George 236 in
which Senator William Goebel was the successful appellate advocate. The Court held that the General Assembly in joint
session could elect the members of the Board of Penitentiary
Commissioners.237 This seemingly innocuous result led to the
controversial "Goebel election law," which created a three-person State Election Commission. 238 The Election Commission,
whose members were appointed by the General Assembly, had
the power to resolve certain disputes and the power to appoint
the members of every local Election Commission. 239 The statute
was upheld in Poyntz v. Shackelford24° and Purnell v. Mann24'
by votes of four to three.
The Goebel election law led to the General Assembly's reversal of the 1899 election.2 2 The General Assembly threw out
the elections of the Republican candidates for Governor and
Lieutenant Governor, thereby seating Goebel as Governor and
Beckham as Lieutenant Governor. 243 These events, unfortunately, culminated in the assassination of Goebel and a state of
anarchy in Frankfort. 244
The Goebel election law was subsequently invalidated in
Pratt v. Breckenridge,24 with the Kentucky Court of Appeals
thereby overruling its previous decisions in George, Poyntz and
Purnell.4 6 Pratt involved a contest of the 1899 election for
Attorney General. 2A7 Relying upon George and its progeny, 248
appellants argued that the language in section 93 which states
that additional inferior officers "may be appointed or elected,
in such manner as may be provided by law," does not give the
47 S.W. 779.
"I See id. at 781-82.
21 See An Act to Further Regulate Elections, Mar. 10, 1898, ch. 13, § 1, 1898 Ky.
Acts 43.
See id.
mo54 S.W. 855.

239

S.W. 407.
See Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177, 178 (Ky. 1900).

24, 48
242
23

See id.

See H. TApP & J. KLOrrER, supra note 13, at 447-50.
-1 65 S.W. 136 (Ky. 1901).

2"

24'

247

See cases cited supra note 235.
See note 238 supra and accompanying text.

"I See cases cited supra note 235.
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Governor exclusive power of appointment.2 9 The Court in Pratt
rejected this interpretation of section 93, thus overruling George
and its progeny. The Court held that section 93 was intended to
permit the General Assembly to determine whether inferior state
officers are to be popularly elected or appointed by the Governor . 0 The Court went on to conclude that if section 93 were

not limited to that interpretation then the General Assembly
would be the dominant branch of government, a result that is

completely contrary to the political sentiment that sought to
restrict legislative power in the Constitution. 251
Pratt was expressly reaffirmed in Sibert v. Garrett, which
involved the State Highway Commission created by the 1922
General Assembly. The Act named two members of the Commission and provided that the remaining two would thereafter
be elected by the General Assembly.2 2 Expressly rejecting the
argument that section 93 permits the General Assembly to appoint members of executive agencies, 25 3 the Court invalidated
19 See 65 S.W. at 137.
250See id. at 140-41.
21 See id. at 140, 142-43. But see IV DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5728-29 for the
Revisory Committee report that a clause granting the Governor exclusive power to
appoint state officers not required to be elected would conflict with § 93. "[I]t would
disturb that settled principle which, we believe, has been approved by the people, that
as to all these subordinates, it should be left to the power of the General Assembly to
say whether they should be elected or appointed, and if not elected by the people, by
whom they should be appointed." Id. at 5728. The next case chronologically after Pratt
was Sewell v. Bennett, 220 S.W. 517 (Ky. 1920). The issue in Sewell was whether a
generally applicable statute requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to all gubernatorial appointments applied to the newly-created Workmen's Compensation Board
since the act creating that board did not require such advice and consent. The Kentucky
Constitution does not contain an advice and consent clause. In the course of holding
that the legislature may impose the advice and consent requirement upon gubernatorial
appointments by statute, the Sewell Court unfortunately referred to the holding in
Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. George saying the legislature could have made the
appointment itself. See id. at 519. Thus, "[t]he Court, indeed, seemed to retreat from
Pratt and revitalize George." L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 922. However, Sewell v.
Bennett did not deal directly with the power of appointment, and was chronologically
sandwiched between Pratt and Sibert. Thus, the Court in L.R.C. v. Brown had no
difficulty in determining that the controlling precedent was Sibert v. Garrett: "It is our
view that Sibert has been unchanged and is therefore dispositive of the central issue
present in these contested statutes." 664 S.W.2d at 923.
2 See An Act to Amend an Act, app. § 1, 1922 Ky. Acts 459, 460.
21, 246 S.W. at 460. The Court concluded:
[Were we to adopt the opposite construction ... it would lead to a virtual
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this statute as violative of the separation of powers embodied in
section 28 of the Constitution and refused to ignore Pratt or to
follow the George case and its progeny.2 4 Directly addressing
the argument that section 93 permits the General Assembly itself
to appoint members of executive agencies, the Court in Sibert
held that only the executive branch can appoint the officers who
5
are to serve in its departments .
In spite of the Court's definitive holding in Sibert that the
overthrow of [the Constitution's] sections 27 and 28, separating the functions of the state government into three grand departments ...
[Tihe power of the Legislature ... is broad enough in section 93 to confer
the power on the Legislature, if appellants' contention be true, to appoint
all inferior state officers ....
whether their functions be strictly legislative,
executive, or judicial. The logical result of the contention, if adopted and
followed, would empower the Legislature to appoint or elect [inter alia]
the private secretary to the Governor. . . . If such power would not tend
or serve to destroy the purpose and intention sought to be accomplished
by separating the powers of government in the Constitution, it would be
difficult to conceive of one that would. Id.
214

See id. at 458. The Court stated:

To begin with, the latest utterance of this court in the Pratt-Breckinridge Case... holds that under no provisions of our present Constitution
is it competent for the Legislature to itself elect, designate, or appoint
officers whose duties are of the nature and character attempted to be
conferred on appellants in this case. But it is said that the opinion in that
case was what might be termed a political one, and which in a sense may
be accepted as true, and that its reasoning should not be followed on that
account, but rather should the doctrine of Sinking Fund Commissioners v.
George ... be applied in this case. Answering that contention, it might
be conceded that there would be much force in it if the George opinion
and those following it were supported by reasoning as sound or sounder
than is found in the Pratt-Breckinridge opinion, which, however, we are
not prepared to admit. Without incorporating excerpts from the latter
opinion, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that its reasoning is far more
convincing than that contained in its short-lived predecessors, and, according to our view, is practically unanswerable. Besides, the doctrine of stare
decisis has not lost its place in the law, and ... it is entitled to great weight
and is adhered to by most courts, unless the principle established by the prior
decisions is clearly erroneous.
Id. (emphasis added).
a" See id. at 460. The Court stated:
[Wjhen sections 93 and 107 conferred the power upon the Legislature to
provide for the "filling of inferior state officers in such manner as may
be prescribed by law," or to "provide for the election or appointment"
of created county or district officers, the conclusion is inevitable, from the
language employed and in the light of the purpose of the constitutional
requirement segregating and separating the functions of government, that
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legislature may not constitutionally usurp the Governor's power
of appointment, the Court held two years later in Craig v.

O'Rear256 that the legislature may choose the members of a

temporary agency. Craig involved the General Assembly's creation of a temporary commission for selecting Morehead and
Murray as college towns. 257 The members of the commission
were appointed by the Speaker and President Pro Tempore.2 8
The Court distinguished Craigand Sibert by observing that Craig
involved selecting members of a temporary agency "appointed
to perform a particular task, who serve without term and whose
functions cease when the purpose is accomplished. . . ."219
In L.R.C. v. Brown the L.R.C. argued that Craig diluted
Sibert's holding that the power of appointment is purely an
executive function. 260 The Court rejected such a broad interprethe authority of the Legislature is limited to making such provisions by
exercising its authority to pass an act containing them and directing upon
whom or with whom the power to appoint or elect was lodged, which
electing and appointing agency should, perhaps, be selected from the
department to which the duties of the office necessarily appertain.
Id. At most, the absence of an express gubernatorial appointments clause means that
the power of appointing some executive subordinates may be reposed in elected Executive
Officers other than the Governor. See Rouse v. Johnson, 28 S.W.2d at 751.
251 S.W. 828 (Ky. 1923).
See id. at 829-30.
2
See id.
"I Id. at 830-31. The Court stated:
The act is assailed on the ground that it violated sections 27 and 28 of the
Constitution.... The first objection to the act is that it is an assumption
of executive power by the Legislature. Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246
S.W. 455, is relied on. That case merely held that appointment to office
was an executive function which could not be exercised by the Legislature
itself. The court, however, was careful to point out that the rule was
confined solely to the appointment of officers and was not intended to
apply to mere temporary agents. While the purpose of the language employed was to call attention to the exception to the rule, and cannot be
regarded as controlling, practically all of the courts hold that mere temporary agents appointed to perform a particular task, who serve without
term and without pay, and whose functions cease when the purpose is
accomplished, may be appointed by the Legislature itself, or in any manner
that it may provide, and we have no doubt of the correctness of this view.
Id.
See 664 S.W.2d at 923. The Court stated:
Appellants urge the Craigv. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828 (1923),
decided two years after Sibert, constituted another veer by the court
and is controlling. We do not agree. In that case, the Court ruled that
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tation of Craig and held that the rationale of Sibert was dispositive of the issue in L.R.C. v. Brown, that is, whether the
26 1
legislature could constitutionally appoint Executive Officers.
If, rather than operating under the American tripartite system of government, the power to appoint state executive officials
was reposed in the General Assembly, our government would
more resemble the British parliamentary system in which the
executive branch is little more than a committee of members of
Parliament. Political scientists may well debate whether the bipartite or tripartite system is preferable, but so long as the
Jeffersonian doctrine of separation of powers continues to be
embodied in sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution,
the tripartite form of government is constitutionally mandated.
The Court was therefore correct in rejecting the L.R.C.'s interpretation of section 93 and holding that the power of appointment is intrinsically executive and therefore, under section 28,
2 62
only to be exercised by an Executive Officer.
2. Statutes Requiring the Governor to Choose His
Appointees from Persons Nominated by the Legislature
Violate the Separation of Powers
Another question raised in L.R.C. v. Brown was whether
the General Assembly can require the Governor to choose his
appointees from a small list of nominees prescribed by the
Speaker or the President Pro Tempore (or any other member of
the General Assembly).2 63 The Court held that the constitutional
infirmity in this bill is the same as in the bills purporting to
empower the Speaker and President Pro Tempore to make the
the General Assembly could appoint "temporary" agents to perform a
particular task, to serve without term and without pay and whose
functions cease when the purpose of such appointment was accomplished.
Id.
2'
See 664 S.W.2d at 913. See also notes 197-99 supra and accompanying text for
a discussion of Sibert.
26 Under Rouse v. Johnson, Brown v. Barkley and Ex parte Auditor of Public
Accounts, the executive power of appointment can be conferred on other elected constitutional Executive Officers. At what point would that infringe upon the Governor's
"supreme executive power" under § 69?
See 664 S.W.2d at 920.
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actual appointments. 2 4 The executive branch must be able to
choose its own subordinates to discharge its duty to faithfully
execute the law.265
If the power of appointment is intrinsically executive, the
legislature may not so restrict the field from which the executive
may choose the appointee that it amounts to a legislative appointment. 266 The statutes involved in L.R.C. v. Brown attempted to limit the Governor's power of appointment to
nominees chosen by members of the General Assembly. 267 This
indirect method of conferring the executive power of appointment upon legislators was held invalid for the same reasons as
were the statutes purporting to permit the Speaker and President
Pro Tempore to actually make appointments. 268
3. Statutes Empowering the L.R. C. to Exercise the
Power of Advice and Consent Regarding Executive
Appointments Are Unconstitutional
Statutes giving the L.R.C. or an interim committee the power
of advice and consent over the Governor's appointments to the
Public Service Commission and the Kentucky Tobacco Research
Board constituted the final encroachment upon the executive
power of appointment.2 9 Perhaps because it does not have an
Appointments Clause, Kentucky's Constitution does not have an
Advice and Consent Clause. 270 But that was not the issue in
See id. at 923.
Id. at 924. Accord Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52; Bradner v. Hammond,
553 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Alaska 1976).
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37, 41 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
("[Qlualifications prescribed by Congress [may] not amount to a 'legislative designation'
of the appointee .... "), aff'd sub nom. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
27 664 S.W.2d at 923.
2m Id. Subsequent to the Court's denial of the petition for rehearing, the L.R.C.
asserted that the portion of the Court's opinion stating that the Governor may make
appointments "without limitation by the General Assembly" required repeal of statutes
relating to such matters as the partisan or gender membership ratios of boards and
commissions. However, that issue had been disposed of in Elrod v. Willis, 203 S.W.2d
18 (Ky. 1947), and was never an issue in L.R.C. v. Brown.
See KRS § 248.510(a)(b) (1981); KRS § 278.050(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
va The Court did, however, uphold a statute requiring Senate approval of appointments in Sewell v. Bennett, 220 S.W. 517. See note 251 supra for a discussion of Sewell.
2"
2

2"
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L.R.C. v. Brown. The infirmity in these statutes was that whatever power of advice and consent may be exercised by the
General Assembly when in session, that power may not be
delegated to an interim committee to be exercised after expiration
of the constitutional, sixty-day limit on legislative sessions. 27'
4.

Section 28 ProhibitsLegislatorsfrom
Serving on Executive Boards

Even under an elastic version of the separation of powers,
the power to execute laws must be kept separate from the power
to enact laws. This concept is embodied in section 28 of the
Kentucky Constitution which provides that "[n]o person ...
being [a member of one branch of government], shall exercise
any power properly belonging to either of the others." Thus, it
is clear that section 28 prohibits a legislator from sitting as a
272
member of a board or agency within the executive department.
A Kentucky case directly on point is Meagher v. Howell,273 in
which the Court held that a state Senator's acceptance of appointment as State Banking Commissioner caused the Senator
to have immediately vacated his Senate seat by operation of
law.

274

Kentucky is not unique in adhering to this view. Indeed, the
great weight of authority holds that statutes permitting legislators
to be members of executive agencies are void for violating the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.275
The L.R.C. nevertheless contended that the statutes were
271 See 664 S.W.2d at 921, 924 (While the trial court held that it was improper for
the General Assembly to delegate the power of advice and consent to the L.R.C., the
Supreme Court merely declared the statute invalid.).
Responding to a petition for rehearing, the Court modified its opinion to divide
the invalidated statutes into two categories. Those statutes providing for appointment of
Executive Officers by the legislative branch were held to create valid offices which must
constitutionally be filled by the executive branch. Those statutes creating executive offices
filled ex officio by legislators were held to have created unconstitutional offices. L.R.C.
v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 924.
23 188 S.W. 373 (1916).
- Id. at 374.
2
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Greer v. State, 212 S.E.2d 836
(Ga. 1975); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958); People v.
Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1929); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79 (N.C.
1982); State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1966).
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valid as a mere exercise of legislative oversight through minority
membership on executive boards and commissions. 276 The Court

had little difficulty dismissing this argument and invalidating
those statutes making certain legislators ex officio members of
277
executive boards and agencies.

C.

The Legislative Veto of Administrative Regulations

Perhaps the most sweeping power conferred upon the L.R.C.
by the 1982 General Assembly was the power to veto administrative regulations. 278 Prior to 1982, the L.R.C. merely reviewed
and commented upon administrative regulations. 279 The new legislation gave the L.R.C. the power to grant or withhold legal
effect from any administrative regulations promulgated by the

executive branch when the General Assembly was not in session.2 0 Thus, these statutes embodied the so-called "legislative
veto of administrative regulations" that Congress and some state

legislatures have experimented with in recent years. Significantly,
every decided case involving the validity of such statutes has

declared them unconstitutional.2 1
The L.R.C. attempted to evade the holdings in these cases
by belittling the Kentucky procedure. The L.R.C. noted that the

review and comment provisions of the bill had been in effect
216 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 34. The L.R.C.'s reliance on State
ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas Turnpike, 273 P.2d 198 (Kan. 1954), was misplaced. The Kansas
Constitution contains no express separation of powers provision. See id. at 206; State
ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d at 790.
See 664 S.W.2d at 924.
27 See KRS § 13.088 (repealed by Acts of 1984, ch. 417,36, effective Apr. 13,
1984). The statute had a nonseverability clause which provided that, if the power of the
L.R.C. to veto administrative regulations were to be declared invalid, the executive
department would have no power whatsoever to promulgate administrative regulations.
See KRS § 13.092(3). See also text accompanying note 301 infra.
-9 See KRS §§ 13.080-.125 (repealed by Acts of 1984, ch. 417, § 36, effective Apr.
13, 1984).
m See KRS § 13.092(1) (repealed by Acts of 1984, ch. 417, § 36, effective Apr.
13, 1984).
ul See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en
banc), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769;
Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783; General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J.
1982); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
2"
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since 1980 and inaccurately asserted that the only substantive

change enacted in 1982 was that which prevented the executive
department from issuing emergency regulations when the L.R.C.
vetoed a proposed regulation. 28 2 Obviously, however, that change

was critical. Under preexisting law, the L.R.C.'s objections were
merely precatory and did not have force of law.32 Agencies
could still implement the desired regulations by simply labeling

them emergency regulations. 2 4 Thus, the change wrought by the
1982 bill was the attempt to give legal effect to the L.R.C.'s
disapproval of administrative regulations. This change violated
the Constitution because it amounted to exercising the lawmak-

by less than all the
ing power in the interim after adjournment
25
members of the General Assembly.
The L.R.C. also asserted that the 1982 bill did not really
permit the L.R.C. to veto administrative regulations, but rather

only permitted it to suspend the legal effect of the regulation
until the General Assembly re-convened. 2 6 The L.R.C. steadfastly contended that there was a difference of constitutional
dimension between vetoing administrative regulations-which the
General Assembly can do by joint resolution-and merely suspending their legal effect. 2 7 However, when the L.R.C. suspends
the effectiveness of a regulation, it deprives the regulation of

force of law. This action is both an improper encroachment into
the power of the executive branch to issue regulations and an

impermissible exercise of the lawmaking power after adjourn288
ment of the General Assembly.

See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 54-55.
See 664 S.W.2d at 918.
See KRS § 13.087(4) (repealed by Acts of 1984, ch. 417, § 36, effective Apr.
13, 1984).
28
See notes 216-22 supra and accompanying text. See also 664 S.W.2d at 918-19
(scheme of legislative or L.R.C. review as anected is an encroachment into the power
of the executive branch).
2
Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 57.
21 Id.
The L.R.C. relied upon Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783. The precise
holding in that advisory opinion was that a New Hampshire statute was an unconstitutional violation of the concept of bicameralism because it vested the veto power in a
legislative committee. See 431 A.2d at 789. The New Hampshire Court did suggest that
the legislature investigate the Wisconsin procedure of suspending a regulation's effectiveness. See id. However, the Wisconsin procedure had already been ruled unconstitutional because suspending regulations constitutes lawmaking by an interim committee.
See 1974 Wisc. Op. Att'y Gen. 159.
664 S.W.2d at 918-19 n.12.
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The Court found that these statutes did "have the effect of
creating a legislative veto of the actions of the executive
branch." 9 Whatever power the General Assembly, while in
session, may have to veto an administrative regulation, it is
constitutionally impermissible for the General Assembly to attempt to delegate that lawmaking power to a committee, such
as the L.R.C., to be exercised in the interim after adjournment. 290 In addition to noncompliance with the Enactment and
Presentment Clauses, the Kentucky bill was a delegation of
legislative power to a small group (in violation of the Bicameral
Clause) to be exercised in the interims between legislative sessions
(in violation of the Adjournment Clause). 29'The L.R.C. attempted to rationalize its veto power over administrative regulations by contending that it could veto a proposed regulation
only if it did not comply with the legislative intent of the statute
being implemented by the regulation. 292 There are a number of
fallacies in this argument.
First and foremost, it overestimates human nature to believe
that legislators ignore current political forces when they "judicially review" proposed regulations. 293 Legislators will not limit
themselves to objective evidence of an earlier legislative intention, but "will inevitably" work out a present intention-a
decision based on what is presently politically desirable or acceptable.294 This, of course, is the essence of the lawmaking
power. The legislative process is by design "political" in the
sense that it works by compromise responsive to the popular
will, but the faithful execution of the laws is supposed to be a

2"

Id. at 918.

m See notes 216-22 supra and accompanying text. See also 664 S.W.2d at 918-19.
19,See KY. CONST. §§ 46, 56, 88. See also State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279
S.E.2d at 635-36 (legislative committee veto is unconstitutional vesting of legislative
power in the hands of a few).
The Court rejected the L.R.C.'s contention that L.R.C. oversight was necessary to
prevent the executive branch from exceeding its authority and to preserve the balance
of power between the legislative and executive branches. See 664 S.W.2d at 919.
_92 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 59-60; 664 S.W.2d at 919 & 1.14
(anyone may form an opinion as to whether an action is legal or not, but not to the
point of vetoing executive action). See also KRS § 13.087(4) (repealed by Acts of 1984,
ch. 417, § 36, effective Apr. 13, 1984).
"I See 279 S.E.2d at 632 n.5; Schubert, Legislative Adjudication of Administrative
Legislation, 7 J. PuB. LAW 134, 157-58 (1958).
- See 673 F.2d at 478.
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rational response to previously established policy. 2 95
Second, the long-standing rule in Kentucky is that the power
to determine whether an administrative regulation is invalid as
exceeding the scope or intent of the underlying statute is a
judicial power. 296 By giving the L.R.C. the power to determine
whether administrative regulations comply with legislative intent,
the General Assembly was attempting to confer upon its leadership (who ex officio comprise the L.R.C.) an inherently judicial power. However, under sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky
Constitution, the legislative branch may not exercise any judicial
powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by specific
provisions of the Constitution. 2 7 Accordingly, the Court held
the statute unconstitutional for delegating to members of the
2
General Assembly an inherently judicial power. 1
Third, L.R.C. review of proposed regulations for conformity
with legislative intent also violates the doctrine of separation of
powers by seriously encroaching upon the judiciary's ability to
discharge its constitutional function of reviewing administrative
regulations. 299 For example, when the courts are determining
whether an administrative regulation is valid, they often look to
legislative intent. Under the scheme prescribed by KRS 13.087(4),
however, the courts would also be required to look at the L.R.C.'s
intervening review and approval of the regulation. This could
become a special problem where the regulation was implementing
a statute enacted decades before the regulation was promulgated.
When the L.R.C.'s interpretation differed from the court's, what
291 See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 H_ v. L. Rv. 1369, 1419 (1976-77). After studying
how the Congressional veto had actually been implemented, the authors concluded:
[I]n all cases congressional review was primarily based on policy. The

reason is not hard to divine: the traditional and constitutional role of
Congress is the formulation and alteration of policy ....
Members of
Congress are unaccustomed, and the institution is ill-equipped, to make a

restrained and judicious examination of a rule's subservience to statutory
purpose.

Id.
217

See 664 S.W.2d at 919.
For example, the Constitution specifically confers judicial powers on the legis-

lative branch in KY. CoNsT. §§ 67 and 109.
2W

664 S.W.2d at 919.
See id.
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would the court have done? If the L.R.C. had approved the
regulation, would the court have been precluded from invalidating it?300 Thus, injecting the L.R.C. into the process of judicial
review was not only a usurpation of judicial power by legislators,
but also an encroachment upon the judicial power which has
been exclusively vested in the Court of Justice by the Constitution.
Once the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto of
administrative regulations, it became necessary to decide the
validity of the draconian nonseverability clause included in the
statute. This clause provided that, if the L.R.C. could not veto
proposed regulations, then the executive department would thereafter be prohibited from issuing any regulations pursuant to any
other statute.3 1'
The nonseverability provision raised questions that go to the
heart of modem administrative law. The doctrine of delegation
of legislative power to administrative agencies has generally fallen
into disuse and disrepute. In fact, it has been disavowed in
Kentucky. 0 2 By enacting this provision, however, the General
Assembly advanced the constitutional and political argument
that, because administrative agencies have only those powers
delegated to them by the legislature, the legislature may withdraw
those powers, including the power to issue administrative regulations.
The Court resolved this fundamental question when it invalidated the nonseverability clause. The Court held that, when the
legislature has enacted a statute, it becomes the constitutional
duty of the Governor and his subordinates to "faithfully execute" that law. 303 It is often necessary to issue regulations in

m Cf. 634 F.2d at 430-32. This problem is compounded when one considers the

well-settled rule that the testimony of legislators after enactment of a statute is not
admissible in court on the issue of legislative intent. See, e.g., Epstein v. Resor, 296 F.
Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970); Decker v. Russell, 357 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1962); Wheeler v. Board of Comm'rs,

53 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Ky. 1932).
-1 See KRS § 13.092(3) (repealed by Acts of 1984, ch. 417, § 36, effective Apr.
13, 1984).
'0 See Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy, 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961). But see Miller
v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
10, See 664 S.W.2d at 919.
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order to faithfully execute the law. Administrative regulations
inform the public of the interpretation placed on the statutes by
the enforcement officials " 'so those concerned may know in
advance all the rules of the game, so to speak, and may act with
reasonable assurance.' -304 Statutory enactments often have ambiguities which must be clarified in the enforcement process.
Indeed, "[t]he chief function of executive agencies is to implement statutes through the adoption of coherent regulatory
schemes. ' 30 5 Thus, the issuance of administrative regulations is
a necessary incident to the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law, and it therefore cannot be totally abrogated by the
legislature.? 6
The cornerstone of administrative law is that the legislature
must make policy decisions when enacting statutes so that the
executive department is doing nothing more than faithfully executing the law when it issues a regulation. If the legislature
enacts a statute conferring standardless discretion on an administrative agency, it is the statute (not just the regulation) that is
invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative power.3 7 Similarly, any regulation that exceeds the scope of the statutes being
implemented is unlawful because it exceeds the duty to execute
the law and amounts to a seizure of legislative power by the
executive branch. 30 1 Although it is true that without statutes there
is nothing for the executive branch to execute, the power to
execute arises from section 81 of the Kentucky Constitution and
3
not from any particular statute. 0
This is not to contend that the executive branch has unbridled
power to issue regulations. There are many statutes that are selfexecuting and others that can be implemented without regula448 A.2d at 443 (quoting Boiler Beverages Inc. v. Davis, 183 A.2d 64 (N.J.
1962)).
Id.
Cf. Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1928) (Court has inherent power to
promulgate judicial rules of practice).
3
539 S.W.2d at 1. The Supreme Court adopted this position in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), but later limited Schechter to its
facts. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249 (1947).
I 664 S.W.2d at 919. See generally Preston v. Clements, 232 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky.
1950) (proper delegation to agency).
664 S.W.2d at 919.
3

30
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tions. Furthermore, future General Assemblies can restrict the
power to issue regulations by amending the underlying statutes.
However, there are some statutes that cannot properly be executed without statements by the executive branch clarifying its
enforcement policy. Whether these announcements are called
interpretive bulletins, rules, regulations, or whatever, it is unconstitutional for the General Assembly to totally prohibit the
310
executive branch from issuing them.
D.

The Power of the Purse

It is an axiom of American government that the legislature
holds the purse strings. The federal and most state constitutions,
for example, require that the budget originate in the House of
Representatives, the arm of government most representative of
the populace. 31 This is traditionally viewed as the means by
which the representatives of the people hold their most powerful
check and balance upon the executive branch. Therefore, this is
the area in which Kentucky's sixty-day limitation upon the legislature's biennial sessions had perhaps its greatest political impact.
The sixty-day limitation afforded the Governor the opportunity to withhold presentation and enactment of the budget
until late in the session. 31 2 This strategy gave the Governor a
monopoly upon budgetary information so that his critics would
not be well armed to oppose his proposal. Withholding the
110
Id.

at 919-20. The Court stated:

The statute in question not only impliedly reorganizes the executive
duties of the Governor, but also attempts to usurp these powers. Having
failed at the first part, it further attempts to restrict the ability of the
Governor to carry out his sworn duties. The General Assembly, by enacting
the clause, has restricted the power of the Governor to carry out his
duties....
The restriction placed on the executive by KRS 13.092(3) effectively
and unconstitutionally limits and interferes with the Governor's mandated
duties.

Id. at 920. See also Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 161 S.W. 988, 992 (Ky.
1913) (legislature may not accomplish by a condition that which is excluded from its
power). See generally Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARv. L. Ray. 1595 (195960).
" See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2; Ky. CONST. § 47.
",

See KY. CONST. §§ 46, 56, 88.
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budget until the end of the session also functioned as a powerful
logrolling tool, as legislators bargained for the inclusion of their
pet projects in the budget. The reformation of the budgetary
process was perhaps the most politically important aspect of the
drive towards legislative parity that culminated in the 1982 General Assembly.
The 1982 General Assembly enacted several changes in the
budgetary process, many of which were not contested by Governor Brown and his Secretary of Finance and Administration,
Robert Warren. 313 For example, the Governor did not oppose
the requirement that the budget be presented on the tenth legislative day. 3 14 There were, however, several budgetary enactments of the 1982 General Assembly which were impleaded in
the litigation, 315 and this is the one area of the case in which the
legislature prevailed on almost all of the issues.
The 1982 Budget Bil 3 16 gave the L.R.C., rather than the
Governor, the power to promulgate the budget instructions used
by all executive agencies in preparing the Governor's proposed
budget. 317 It also required the budget to be presented as a joint
resolution, rather than as a bill 31 8 and provided that the budget
resolution could not implicitly repeal any provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 319 The bill also contained provisions requiring the Governor's proposed budget, as well as the budget
enacted by the General Assembly, to specify how the respective
branches would cope with revenue shortfalls during the interims
32
between sessions of the legislature. 0
A related issue involved block grants. With the federal government's shift from grant-in-aid programs targeted by subject
matter to block grants, state legislatures became increasingly
311
Mr. Warren had served as Deputy Auditor of Public Accounts under George
Atkins and had participated directly in the efforts of the so-called "Black Sheep" to
open the last budget proposed by Governor Julian Carroll. Mr. Warren favored many
of the reforms enacted by the 1982 General Assembly.
31. See KRS § 48.100(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
31 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 36 for a list of statutes impleaded.
See Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 450, §§ 1-30, 1982 Ky. Acts 1568 (codified at
3,6
KRS chapter 48 (1983)).
37 See KRS § 48.040 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
3,1See KRS § 48.300 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
1" See KRS § 48.130 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
32D
See id.
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interested in subjecting the block grant revenues to the power
of appropriation. The 1982 General Assembly tried to do this
by requiring that "[n]o state administering agency shall submit
any block grant application to a fe.deral administering agency
unless approved by the [L.R.C.]. ' ' 32 The act also provided that,
if the court invalidated the provision requiring L.R.C. approval
of the expenditure of block grant monies, then no block grant
monies could be expended until the next session of the General
3 2
Assembly. 2
In L.R.C. v. Brown, the Court acknowledged the legislature's preeminence in budgetary matters, while invalidating some
of the statutes as an infringement upon the Governor's consti3 23
tutional obligation to "faithfully execute" the budget.
1. Managing Revenue Shortfalls in the Interims
Between Legislative Sessions
The Governor's ability to spend surplus revenues during the
interims between sessions of the legislature, or to determine
budget cuts in the event of a revenue shortfall, has been a
traditional source of political power to the Governor and, consequently, a source of considerable irritation to legislators.
Nevertheless, this power had withstood challenges in the courts
because the General Assembly had delegated the power to the
Governor by statute. 32 4
The governorship of John Y. Brown, Jr. was one of deficits,
not surpluses. During the first biennium of his administration
he was required to make severe cuts in the budget enacted by
the legislature. This situation, together with the general wave of
legislation asserting legislative independence, produced a new
statute prescribing how revenue shortfalls would be handled. 321
The executive branch argued that these statutes were uncon321See

KRS § 45.3511(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
M See KRS § 49.359 (Cum. Supp. 1984). See also 664 S.W.2d at 928-29.
rn See 664 S.W.2d at 919-20. It is well-settled that the administration of a budget
act, after its enactment, is an executive function which cannot be delegated to an interim

legislative committee. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lamm, 579 P.2d 620 (Colo. 1978); State
ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1976); In re Opinion of the Justices,
295 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. 1982).
- See, e.g., Hopkins v. Ford, 534 S.W.2d 792 (Ky. 1976).
3
See KRS §§ 48.040, .130, .400, .600 (1983) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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stitutional because they permitted the L.R.C. to determine
whether budget cuts proposed by the Governor could be implemented. 326 The Court simply disagreed with that reading of the
statute. The Court held that requiring the executive branch to

implement a legislatively enacted spending reduction plan for
revenue shortfalls of less than 5 percent is not an intrusion into
the constitutional powers of the executive branch. 327 The Court
also construed the statute as not permitting the L.R.C. to veto
actions by the Governor pertaining to the executive budget in
revenue shortfalls exceeding five percent, but only requiring the

Governor to report those actions to the L.R.C. Thus, the statute
was narrowly construed to avoid the constitutional question.

The revenue shortfall issues were the only issues in this case
having a financial impact upon the judicial branch, and it is
interesting to note the Court's disposition of those issues. For
example, the Court was careful to emphasize, albeit subtly, that
revenue shortfalls are dealt with separately and specifically by
the head of each branch of government. 321 In other words, no
longer can the Governor reduce the budget of the Court of

Justice in the event of a revenue shortfall; only the Chief Justice

329
has that right.

The impact upon the judiciary may also explain its curious
treatment of KRS section 48.600. The language of that statute
316

See Brief for Appellees, supra note 93, at 98-101.

"I See id. at 925-27. The executive branch had also contended that KRS §§ 48.130
and 48.500 permitted the L.R.C., in the interims between sessions of the legislature, to
veto decisions of the executive branch implementing the budget. See Brief for Appellees,
supra note 93, at 103-05. The Supreme Court narrowly construed the statutes as limiting
the L.R.C. to oversight functions. In upholding the statutes, the Court said:
If the [L.R.C.] disagrees with [any] branch's interpretation [of the appropriations act], that branch may not implement its plan unless and until
(1) its interpretation is amended to conform to that of the [L.R.C.], or (2)
the branch notifies the [L.R.C.] of its intention not to agree with the
[L.R.C.] and explains its view for noncompliance. When the branch complies with either of the conditions, it may proceed with its own interpretation.
664 S.W.2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
"I See 664 S.W.2d at 927.
12
Id. One might envision that even if the statutes upheld by the Court in L.R.C.
v. Brown had been repealed, the Court would have relied upon Ex parte Auditor of
Public Accounts to hold as a matter of constitutional law that this result is required.
See notes 127-43 supra and accompanying text.
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as enacted and codified makes it applicable to a "projected
deficit . . .of less than five percent (5%). ' ' 33° There is no provision in the statute for revenue shortfalls exceeding five percent.
Many observers thought this meant that if the shortfall exceeded
five percent, the Governor would be required to call a special
session of the legislature to cope with the problem. Nonetheless,
the Court's original slip opinion said: "KRS 48.600 provides for
the situation when revenue shortfalls exceed 5%70 of the estimates. "331 In their Response to the Petition for Rehearing, attorneys for the executive branch pointed out this seeming
inconsistency to the Court.3 32 The Court's response was twofold. It added a footnote which cites KRS section 48.130, a
statute which also applies to revenue shortfalls of "not more
than 5%.1"333 Viewing KRS sections 48.130 and 48.600 as being
in apparent conflict with each other, the Court-in a novel use
of grammatical signals to resolve an issue of statutory constructions-added the word "sic" to its quotation from KRS 48.600,
thereby making the statute applicable to revenue shortfalls exceeding five percent. 334 This resolution of the seeming conflict in
the statutes comports with the Court's preferences for the allocation of power among the three branches. It permits the Chief
Justice, rather than the Governor, to allocate reductions in the
budget of the Court of Justice, and it obviates the necessity of
a special session of the legislature.
2. The Budget Must Be a Bill, Not a Joint Resolution
The new legislation also required that the budget bill be a
joint resolution.3 35 Furthermore, it provided that the budget res36
olution could not implicitly repeal any statutory provision.
The obvious problem is that, should the General Assembly inadvertently overlook some obscure statute that was inconsistent
3- See KRS § 48.600(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
31, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 Slip op. at 40.
312Appellees' Response to Petition for Rehearing at 9, L.R.C. v. Brown, 664
S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
M See 664 S.W.2d at 925 n.24.
334 Id.
"3
3M

See KRS § 48.300 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
See KRS § 48.310 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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with the funding level prescribed in the budget resolution, the
inconsistent statute would not be impliedly repealed.
The Court also held that the Constitution requires that the
budget take the form of a bill. 337 The Kentucky Constitution
requires the budget to be enacted by "a bill" which the Governor
38
may veto line-by-line.

3.

EncompassingFederal Block Grants into the

Budgetmaking Process
The 1982 block grant bill conferred upon the L.R.C. final
authority for approval of block grant applications: "No state
administering agency shall submit any block grant application
to a federal administering agency unless approved by the legis-

lative research commission .... -339 The Court invalidated this
provision for two reasons. 34 First, "[tihe preparation and adopSee 664 S.W.2d at 928.
Ky. CONST. §§ 47, 88. Concurrent resolutions, in Kentucky, must be enacted as
statutes and presented to the Governor for veto. KY. CoNsr. § 89.
331 See KRS § 45.3511(2) (Cum. Cupp. 1984).
3 The Court's holding made it unnecessary to respond to two L.R.C. arguments.
One of the L.R.C.'s arguments in support of this bill was that federal law required this
procedure. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 44. However, federal law neither
authorizes nor requires legislative veto of block grant applications. See 42 U.S.C. §§
9901-12 (1982). While it does require citizen participation via "public hearings" conducted by a legislative committee, see 42 U.S.C. § 9904(b), there is a substantial
distinction between "public hearings" and "legislative hearings." Legislative hearings
envision a decision-making and information gathering process by the legislators, whereas
public hearings envision a public forum for citizen participation, without any requirement
of legislative decision-making following the hearing. Both the legislative history and
regulations implementing the relevant federal statutes demonstrate that Congress was
concerned with participation by the public, not with a veto by state legislators. See 47
Fed. Reg. 29, 474-75 (1982). See also 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 893.
The L.R.C. also argued that block grant funds are really state funds and therefore
must be appropriated by the General Assembly. See Brief for Appellants, supra note
110, at 44. There is a split in authority as to whether federal grants are state funds
subject to legislative power of appropriation or federal funds to be administered by a
state's executive branch. Compare Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1978) (federal
funds subject to General Assembly's power to make appropriations) and Opinion of the
Justices, 381 A.2d 1204 with Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Adm'n, 528 P.2d 623 (Ariz.
1974) (legislature lacks authority); MacManus v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1979)
(legislature could create a health planning and development agency to appropriate federal
monies); Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1978) (legislature may not
appropriate money received in trust from the federal government); and State ex rel.
Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974) (legislature lacks authority).
'"
"'
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tion of a budget is a legislative matter and the General Assembly
may not delegate this law making power to the LRC. ' 341 Second,
the General Assembly may not circumvent the Adjournment
Clause by attempting to "legislate through its agent, the [LRC]"
during the interims between legislative sessions.3 42 By holding
that the 'L.R.C. may not appropriate block grants, the Court
had to determine the validity of the nonseverability clause of
that bill, which provided: "If any other section of [this Act] is
declared unconstitutional, any other statute to the contrary notwithstanding, no block grant money received from the United
States government shall be spent or allocated unless appropriated
' '343
by the general assembly in regular or special session.
The trial court had invalidated this provision as an unconstitutional condition because, in practical terms, Kentucky's receipt of millions in federal funds between the 1982 and 1984
sessions of the General Assembly would have been jeopardized
if the state government had spent this money illegally. 344 Constitutionally, however, the provision was valid as an exercise of
legislative "responsibility for the preparation and adoption of
3 45
the state budget.
The Supreme Court was able to moot the practical problem
34
by waiting until the 1984 session convened to issue its opinion. 1
The legislature could then respond to the problems created when
the Court upheld the nonseverability provision.3 47 The result is
that block grant monies, along with all other revenues, are now
34
estimated and appropriated in the biennial budget.
E. Executive Reorganizations
Prior to 1982, the Governor was empowered by statute to
-14664 S.W.2d at 928-29. This holding comports with the holdings in the only other
reported decisions on the issue. See Advisory Opinion In re Separation of Powers, 295
S.E.2d 589 (N.C. 1982); State ex rel. McLeod v. Mclnnis, 295 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 1982).
412
664 S.W.2d at 928-29.
-4' KRS § 45.359 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
I" L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 Opinion and Judgment at 14.
'4'

See 664 S.W.2d at 930.

argument was held in March, 1983 and the opinion was rendered January
19, 1984, a few days after the 1984 General Assembly convened.
14Oral

4'

See 664 S.W.2d at 930.

'4

KRS § 45.305 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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reorganize the executive department, with certain statutory exceptions. 349 The L.R.C. was permitted to comment upon interim
reorganizations, but its comments did not have the force of
law.35 0 However, if the Governor's reorganization was, not ap35
proved by the next General Assembly, it became in6perative. 1
This procedure was altered by the 1982 General Assembly.
Under (new) KRS section 12.028(2), the Governor's temporary
reorganization plan was required to be "approved by the
[L.R.C.]" before it could go into effect. 352 The Supreme Court
correctly held that, as with the veto of regulations, this statute
purported to give the L.R.C.'s veto the same force of law as
53
that of the General Assembly in regular session.
The L.R.C. sought to justify this exercise of lawmaking
power by asserting that an L.R.C. veto "does not constitute a
legislative act since [the L.R.C. does] not affirmatively take any
action, [but] merely react[s] to action initiated by the Governor. ' 35 4 However, absent the provisions of that statute, an executive order reorganizing the executive branch would have legal
effect the instant it was promulgated by the Governor. Thus,
regardless of the label affixed to the L.R.C.'s action under the
bill, the L.R.C.'s ability to refuse to approve a reorganization
would have prevented executive branch action and would have
had the force of law. However, a group of legislators may not
give force of law to its action without complying with all con3 55
stitutional provisions for the enactment of a statute.
Furthermore, Brown v. Barkley leaves no doubt that, in
Kentucky, reorganization is an executive power. 3 6 Thus, once
the General Assembly determines that the power to reorganize
state government during the interims between legislative sessions
349 See L.R.C. v.

Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 930. See also Brown v. Barkley, 628

S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1982) (Statute does not authorize Governor to transfer certain functions,
personnel, and funds from Dep't of Agriculture to newly created Energy and Agriculture
Dep't.).
310664 S.W.2d at 930.
351Id.
3

See KRS § 12.028(2)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1984).

311See

664 S.W.2d at 930.

Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at 54 (emphasis in original).
"I See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
673 F.2d at 465-68. See also General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438.
3- See 628 S.W.2d at 622.
3-
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must exist and enacts an enabling statute, Brown v. Barkley
makes it clear that the exercise of that power constitutes an
executive function.3 5 7 The L.R.C. cannot exercise executive func358
tions.
In sum, the Governor has no inherent power to reorganize
government absent an enabling statute. 35 9 Accordingly, executive
orders effecting reorganizations can, by statute, be rendered
inoperative if not approved in the next session of the General
Assembly.3 6 However, the legislature cannot condition the Gov36
ernor's reorganization power upon approval by the L.R.C. 1
Consequently, the Court invalidated that portion of KRS section
12.028(2) that vested the L.R.C. with power to veto executive
reorganizations.3 62 The remainder of the reorganization statute
continues in force.
CONCLUSION: IN PRAI SE OF L.R.C. v. Brown
No decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court prior to L.R.C.
v. Brown involved as many historically significant constitutional
issues. The Court's resolution of those issues produced an opinion of historic magnitude, not merely because it disposed of so
many significant issues, but because it disposed of them in an
extremely well-crafted opinion which convincingly explains the
correctness of the Court's decision.
See 664 S.W.2d at 930.

'

See id.
id. at 931.

311See
'1

61

Id. at 930-31.

Id.

ml See id. at 930.

